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MADISON‘S FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE:
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Charles M. Yablon

ABSTRACT
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) has created a new wave of
interest in the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its apparent contradictions. Important recent scholarship has shown that American lawyers in
the eighteenth century often viewed the term “full faith and credit” as
referring to an evidentiary rule. This interpretation ameliorates, but
does not actually resolve, the apparent conflict between the first sentence of the Clause, which seems to create a mandatory rule of sister
state deference, and the second sentence of the Clause, which seems to
give Congress plenary power to abrogate that rule. Rather than seek a
chimerical general understanding of the Clause, this Article focuses on
James Madison to provide a new and strikingly different historical account of the creation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It shows how
the Full Faith and Credit Clause was part of a broader plan by Madison and others to curb the ability of states to take acts that were harmful to one another and to the nation, particularly those which, by interfering with vested contract and property rights, jeopardized the
country’s economic well-being. Madison purposely sought a Clause that
would embody a vague but dynamic deference obligation that could be
increased by Congress over time.
Madison’s actions and writings regarding the Full Faith and Credit Clause strongly suggest that he would have considered congressional actions to weaken or abrogate existing deference obligations not just
unwise and unjust, but unconstitutional. Unlike powers which appropriately belonged to the federal legislature irrespective of how they
were exercised, Madison’s justification for the powers granted under
the second sentence of the Clause was based on how Madison expected
those powers to be used, namely, to “provide for the harmony and
proper intercourse among the states.” What emerges from this analysis
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is a picture of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that has significant similarities to the “one way ratchet” interpretation which has been used
to argue that the DOMA is unconstitutional, but one in which the presumed constraints on congressional action are the product of national
interest, political virtue, and natural law as well as the language of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.
INTRODUCTION
The Full Faith and Credit Clause1 is the only part of the United
States Constitution that appears, at least to modern eyes, to contain a
contradiction. The first sentence consists of an unconditional mandate
that:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State.

Yet the second and final sentence, the so-called ―Effects Clause,‖
appears to grant plenary power to Congress to prescribe what effects, if
any, the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of one state will have in
the others:
And Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.

It would appear that any coherent interpretation of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause must privilege one of these sentences over the other,
and will therefore require a substantial departure from the actual text.
The apparent inconsistency in the language of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause becomes a concrete legal issue, however, only if Congress chooses to pass a law that appears to violate the mandate of the
first sentence of the Clause. Congress arguably did that in 1996 with the
passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),2 which has created a
1 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The phrase ―full faith and credit‖ was taken verbatim (but only
after considerable debate among the founders) from a very similar clause in the Articles of Confederation, whose drafters may have been the first to use it. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 488–89 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter 2 Farrand]. The derivation of
the phrase in the Articles is uncertain and has been the subject of much recent historical research.
See, e.g., David Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584, 1607
(2009); Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201,
1217–22 (2009).
2 1 U.S.C § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). DOMA seeks to relieve states of any obligation to give legal effect to same-sex marriages that have been recognized under the laws of other states. The recent decisions and legislative acts legalizing same-sex marriage in New York,
Maine, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, Massachusetts and other states make it very likely that
DOMA will increasingly be invoked in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage to avoid
giving legal effect to such marriages in states that now permit them. See A.B. 8354, 234th Leg.,
2011-2012 Sess. (N.Y. 2011); S.B. 115, 2009 Leg., 2009-2010 Sess. (Vt. 2009) (legislation legalizing same-sex marriage); L.D. 1020, 124th Leg., 1st Sess. (Me. 2009) (legislation legalized
same-sex marriage, but was overturned by a proposition the same year); H.B. 436, 161st Leg., 1st
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new wave of interest in the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its apparent
contradictions. Some important recent scholarship has sought to interpret the clause through historical inquiries into the meaning of the term
―full faith and credit‖ in England and the United States in the eighteenth
century and more generally into the conflict of law rules that existed at
that time.3 This work has shown that the term ―full faith and credit‖ was
Sess. (N.H. 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm‘r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that
limiting marriage to heterosexual couples is unconstitutional); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862
(Iowa 2009) (holding statute limiting marriage to heterosexual couples violative of equal protection); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding no ―constitutionality adequate reason‖ for denying right to gay marriage). California‘s back-and-forth
stance on same-sex marriage raises unique DOMA issues. Recently, a federal district court overturned California‘s ban on same-sex marriage (enacted by referendum); the referendum had overturned an act of the state legislature legalizing same-sex marriage. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The status of same-sex couples married in California before the ban remains unclear. Additionally, the legalization of same-sex marriage in the District of
Columbia raises unique DOMA issues. It is not a state, and states‘ full faith obligations to it are
unclear. See D.C. CODE § 46–401 (2010).
The Department of Justice‘s recent decision not to defend the constitutionality of DOMA
relates only to Section 3 of that statute, which defines marriage, for federal law purposes, as ―only
a legal union between one man and one woman,‖ which the Attorney General found violative of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Att‘y Gen., to John
Boehner, U.S. Speaker of the House (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with author). The Department of
Justice did not discuss Section 2 of DOMA, which relieves states of any obligation to recognize
same-sex marriages in other states and which arguably rests on an independent constitutional basis, the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id. As more married same-sex
couples seek to assert their rights in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage, we can expect more litigation invoking Section 2 of DOMA and challenging its constitutionality. That constitutional issue will turn on precisely the same interpretative question about the meaning of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause described at the beginning of this piece.
3 Historical articles dealing with the Full Faith and Credit Clause tend to appear when the
Clause becomes involved in contemporary constitutional issues. Kurt Nadelmann‘s exhaustive
historical inquiry was the last of a number of historical pieces generated by contemporary issues
concerning the effect of the Clause on out of state application of workman‘s compensation laws.
See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A HistoricalAnalytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 75 (1957). Ralph Whitten has produced even more
exhaustive historical analyses of the Clause, first in connection with contemporary debates about
the constitutional limitations on state assertion of territorial jurisdiction, Ralph U. Whitten, The
Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part One), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV.
499 (1980) [hereinafter Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction], and later offered a revised and expanded version of that analysis in response to the controversy following the passage of DOMA,
Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 257 (1998) (first sentence of the Clause
―originally understood as a narrow evidentiary command‖) [hereinafter Whitten, FF&C and
DOMA]. Douglas Laycock‘s discussion of the historical origins of the clause was part of a broader argument concerning constitutional limits on choice of law rules. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992). Daniel A. Crane also deals with these historical questions in connection with the DOMA controversy concluding that the first sentence was ―a default provision in
the absence of more specific congressional legislation.‖ Daniel A. Crane, The Original Understanding of the “Effects Clause” of Article IV, Section 1 and Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 335 (1998) [hereinafter Crane, Original Understanding].
More recently, Steven Sachs has shown that the early Congress did not always consider the first
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not understood to be nearly as sweeping as it now appears, but was often viewed by American lawyers in the late eighteenth century as an
evidentiary rule, requiring only that courts take cognizance of judgments validly issued by other states and treat them as prima facie evidence of the underlying claim.4 It did not necessarily require that such
judgments be treated as conclusively determining the pending dispute.5
If this meaning is applied to the first sentence of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, the apparent conflict is ameliorated, although not actually
resolved.6 The self-executing mandate of the first sentence is reduced to
a narrow evidentiary rule, leaving an untrammeled Congress free, under

sentence to be self-executing and that it was often understood as part of an evidentiary framework.‖ Sachs, supra note 1, at 1201. Finally, in an important recent article in the Yale Law Journal, David Engdahl provides additional support for an evidentiary interpretation of the term ―full
faith and credit‖ in sources prior to the Constitution, which he couples with a reading of the constitutional clause which leaves the question of the effect of sister state judgments, ―dependent
entirely on Congress‘s discretion.‖ Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1658. This article is, in large measure, a response to the articles by Professors Whitten, Engdahl, and Sachs.
4 See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1655; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1206; Whitten, FF&C and
DOMA, supra note 3, at 257.
5 In theory, one can distinguish between a pure evidentiary rule, which deals only with procedures for authenticating and proving the existence and content of a foreign judgment or other
official act without specifying its effect, and rules which set forth the effect of such judgments,
once proved. Professor Sachs most clearly takes this minimalist view of the first sentence of the
constitutional clause as well as the Articles‘ clause, arguing that in their original meaning, both
dealt only with ―authentication‖ issues. Sachs, supra note 1, at 1226, 1230. Whitten takes almost
the same position, but believes that the clauses required not only that the sister state judgments be
authenticated but that they be admitted into evidence. Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3,
at 269–71; Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 546–47. Both Whitten and Sachs
believe that courts would use other legal principles, namely those of the law of nations, to determine the effect such evidence would have. See Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at 284;
Sachs, supra note 1, at 1213, 1225. They agree that the usual result, based on English precedents
of the time, was to treat the foreign judgment as prima facie evidence of the claim. See Sachs,
supra note 1, at 1213; Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at 284. Engdahl appears to endorse a somewhat more expansive interpretation. See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1610. Beginning
with the English case law, which not only recognized foreign judgments, but also generally
treated them as at least prima facie evidence of the underlying claim, Engdahl argues that this
―familiar prima facie evidence rule‖ was incorporated into the meaning of the term ―full faith and
credit‖ in the Articles‘ clause. Id. at 1611. All these writers contrast this with a rule of ―substantive deference‖ that required the courts of one state to treat the judgments of another as conclusive on the underlying claim, much as they would an authenticated prior judgment of their own
state courts. See id.; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1206; Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at
273–74. Whitten, Engdahl, and Sachs all recognize that rules of substantive deference were sometimes applied under the law of nations (as in admiralty cases) but do not believe that it was part of
the meaning of either the Articles‘ clause or the first sentence of the constitutional Clause. See
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1593; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1215; Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra
note 3, at 269–70. As we can see from this brief discussion, however, not only is there uncertainty
over the meaning of the Clause, but it is closely related to uncertainty over the extent, if any, to
which the Clause was intended to embody principles of deference taken from the law of nations,
as well as uncertainty over the precise content of that law.
6 The question would still remain whether Congress had constitutional power to abrogate or
substantially modify the evidentiary or prima facie evidence rules presumably embodied in the
first sentence of the Clause.
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the second sentence, to legislate substantially regarding the effects of
such judgments.7
The historical research that underlies these arguments is impressive, and the authors have provided much important new information
about procedural and evidentiary practice in eighteenth-century England
and America. Yet there are serious methodological flaws in their attempts to provide an accurate historical account of the creation and
meaning of the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause. First, it is
extremely doubtful that there is any single right answer to their narrowly focused search for the meaning of the term ―full faith and credit‖ as
used in the Constitution or the authorities that preceded it. These scholars‘ careful examination of sources has revealed substantial inconsistencies in the use of the term in English practice,8 in the jurisprudence
of the individual states,9 and in cases decided under the Articles of Confederation.10 In short, what these scholars have really shown is that there
was no consensus at the time of the Founding concerning the legal
meaning of the term. Rather, as commentators at the time acknowledged, the language itself was highly disputable and ―indeterminate.‖11
In light of that ambiguity, modern attempts to establish an accurate
―original meaning‖ for the phrase as a legal term of art seems a quixotic
one.
Moreover, this narrow focus on doctrinal conflicts regarding the
precise legal meaning of the full faith and credit language of the Clause
fails to recognize the broader constitutional issues that were foremost in
the minds of the Founders as they debated the appropriate scope and

7 Nadelmann concluded that the first sentence of the Clause created a self-implementing
command on each state to enforce applicable statutes of sister states in the absence of conflicting
state policies, and that the second sentence of the Clause conferred power on Congress to act
when such conflicts arose. Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 79–80. Whitten argued, in both his articles, that the first sentence of the clause was, in the absence of congressional action, merely an
evidence rule requiring that states admit and recognize authenticated versions of state records as
proof of the laws and judgments of sister states. Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at
263–64; Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 545–46. Laycock provides the strongest version of the first sentence of the Clause, arguing that it is a self effectuating rule that requires states to enforce sister state laws in accordance with common law choice of law rules,
which can be altered by congressional action. Laycock, supra note 3, at 298–301. Crane, while
acknowledging ―some tension‖ between the first and second sentence of the Clause, concludes
that the first sentence was merely a default provision until Congress provided more specific rules.
Crane, Original Understanding, supra note 3, at 323–24.
8 After examining the eighteenth-century English law on recognition of foreign judgments,
scholars have concluded that ―full faith and credit‖ and similar terms ―appear to have been evidentiary terms of art that could be used to cover a range of effects and weights.‖ Whitten, StateCourt Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 520.
9 While a number of the states had statutes which can be plausibly read to embody versions
of the prima facie rule, Massachusetts passed a statute in 1774 which appeared to prescribe a conclusive effect for sister state judgments. Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 531.
10 See infra notes 64–88 and accompanying text.
11 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); see also discussion infra Part I.B.
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operation of the full faith and credit obligation. As we will see, the sophisticated lawyers among the Founders were well aware that the language they were adopting in the first sentence of the Clause was somewhat vague and had been subject to differing interpretations, but were
not overly concerned about ambiguities in the prior law involving sisterstate deference.12 Rather, the concerns of Madison and his allies concerning full faith and credit were more closely tied to the broader issues
facing the Convention, concerns about the relative powers of the federal
and state governments, about the need to avoid ―trespasses‖ of the powers of one state on those of others, and the need to deter interference by
misguided state legislators on minority interests and vested property
rights, particularly those of out-of-state creditors.13 It was these concerns that shaped the debate about the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
determined its final form.
This Article seeks to provide a broader, more historically accurate
account of the creation and original conception of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Rather than seek a chimerical general understanding of
the Clause, it seeks to ascertain how the Clause was understood at the
time of the Founding by one particularly powerful intellect—that of
James Madison.14 Madison is generally viewed as the ―Father of the
Constitution,‖15 the founder who came to Philadelphia having done the
most profound thinking about republican forms of government and the

12 See discussion infra Part II.B. There is little doubt that contemporary lawyers recognized
the indeterminacy of the full faith obligation set forth in the Articles of Confederation, which can
be seen in contemporary case law, in statements concerning the meaning of that sentence during
the Constitutional Convention, and perhaps most clearly, in the comments of James Madison in
Federalist 42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). Closely related to this is an exaggeration by modern scholars of the importance of this interpretative dispute to lawyers of the period,
and particularly to the Founders. The primary practical effect of the distinction between an evidentiary and substantive rule was whether merits-based defenses could be asserted. The distinction was of little practical significance in the many suits decided on default judgment, see Deborah Rosen, The Supreme Court of Judicature of Colonial New York: Civil Practice in Transition,
1691–1760, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 213, 230 (1987) (noting very high default rates in colonial
courts) [hereinafter Rosen, Supreme Court], or in suits against impecunious debtors with no substantive defenses to assert, and again, Madison tells us as much in Federalist 42. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 42 (James Madison). Madison‘s disparagement of interpretive disputes in matters of technical law was very much in keeping with the general attitude towards law in the post-revolutionary
period, where attempts to displace ―archaic English laws and legal technicalities‖ with simplified
codes, later gave rise to calls for more discretionary application of ―general rules of equity.‖ Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More
Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 791–92 (1999) [hereinafter Wood, Judicial Review
Revisited].
13 See discussion infra Part I.A.
14 Doing so will, of course, also give us substantial insight into the views of many of those
who shared Madison‘s perspective on the Constitution.
15 LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 76 (1995); IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE
CONSTITUTION 155 (1950) [hereinafter BRANT, FATHER].
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weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation.16 He had the most coherent, innovative, and comprehensive plans for reshaping the American
republic.17 Yet he was also a practical politician, skilled in the uses of
ambiguity, compromise, and countervailing forces to achieve his broader political goals.18 He was also a member of the Virginia planter aristocracy,19 seriously concerned about the dangers posed by perceived excesses of democratic governance to vested property rights.20
It was Madison who proposed the precise language that became the
actual text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.21 He played a prominent
role in the debates that led to its passage, and in drafting the final language of the Clause. It was Madison who inserted mandatory rather
than hortatory language into the first sentence of the Clause (changing
―ought‖ to ―shall‖).22 Yet it was also Madison who argued, in Federalist
No. 42, that it was the grant of broad powers to Congress in the second
sentence of the Clause that rendered it ―an evident and valuable improvement‖ over the Articles of Confederation.23
In recent years there has been a small boom in interest among historians and legal scholars in the political thought of James Madison and
the role it played in the creation of the Constitution.24 There have also
16 See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the U. States (Apr. 1787), in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 361 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1901) [hereinafter
Madison, Vices]; see also BANNING, supra note 15, at 115; WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE
BUSINESS OF MAY NEXT: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING 22 (1992); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 472 (1969) [hereinafter WOOD, THE
CREATION].
17 JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 49
(3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter RAKOVE, MADISON].
18 See BANNING, supra note 15, at 88–91; RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A
BIOGRAPHY 94–95, 112, 114–15 (spec. ed. 2003); Randall Strahan, Personal Motives, Constitutional Forms and the Public Good: Madison on Political Leadership, in JAMES MADISON: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 67 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2003).
19 KETCHAM, supra note 18, at 3–7; RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 1.
20 RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 54, 59; JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS
LEGACY 25–38 (1990) [hereinafter NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY].
21 That is, after the language of the Clause had been substantially approved, Madison proposed the final substantive changes in the text, changing ―ought‖ in the first sentence to ―shall‖
and ―should‖ in the second sentence to ―may,‖ changes that were approved unanimously. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 484–85; see also notes 222–225 infra and accompanying text.
22 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 489.
23 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
24 This recent scholarship has provided new insights into Madison‘s political thought at the
time of the founding, his practical political concerns and the compromises he was willing or felt
compelled to make to keep the project going. Whereas earlier scholars saw Madison at the time of
the Founding as an ardent federalist with little regard for the preservation of state‘s rights who
later changed into a Jeffersonian republican, see generally BRANT, FATHER, supra note 15, at 11–
13, 351; WOOD, THE CREATION, supra note 16, at 525, the newer scholarship stresses the continuities in Madisonian thought and views him as always trying to steer a middle path between the
excesses of state and federal power. See generally BANNING, supra note 15; RAKOVE, MADISON,
supra note 17, at 57. This new scholarship emphasizes Madison‘s pragmatism, as well as the ten-
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been important new studies into the extent to which Madison and other
founders anticipated judicial review, particularly regarding the constitutionality of federal legislation.25
This Article seeks to use this work to provide a new and strikingly
different historical account of the creation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. It shows that the fundamental debate over the Clause at the
Constitutional Convention was not between advocates of evidentiary
and substantive interpretations of the full faith obligation—as most prior
scholarship has assumed—but between advocates of a substantive but
static and limited rule of deference clearly set out in the constitutional
text, and those, like Madison, who favored a vaguer but more dynamic
rule of substantive deference that could be enhanced by Congressional
enactment and that could lead to a relatively unified litigation system in
which judgments rendered in one state could be executed in the courts
of another.
It also shows how the Full Faith and Credit Clause was part of a
broader plan by Madison and others to curb the ability of states to take
acts that were harmful to one another or to the nation as a whole, particularly those which, by interfering with vested contract and property
rights, jeopardized the country‘s economic well-being. To this end, the
full faith obligation was expanded to include deference to legislative
acts of sister states, a deference that was expected to apply only to that
relatively narrow class of state laws that created, defined, or altered
property or contract rights that might be enforced in other states, including bankruptcy laws of general import. Equally importantly, the federal
legislature was given broad power to define and develop these obligations. Madison hoped and expected that Congress would act as a ―disinterested and dispassionate umpire‖26 among the states, using the full
faith and credit obligation to help create a coordinated judicial system
for the protection and enforcement of creditors‘ rights.27
tativeness and uncertainty with which Madison approached the task of Constitution drafting, his
recognition that the political system the Founders were seeking to create had no real precedents in
history and that its operation in practice was uncertain and unknowable. It also recognizes the
important role that political ―virtue‖ played in Madison‘s thought, his belief that the constitutional
system being created could only survive if the powers of the federal government were wielded by
men of vision and honor, who could avoid the pitfalls of faction and interstate rivalry which he
saw as so endemic and destructive in the Articles of Confederation period. Id. at 51; David Brian
Robertson, Constituting a National Interest: Madison Against the States’ Autonomy, in JAMES
MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 200–01 (Samuel Kernell
ed., 2003).
25 See discussion infra Part III.
26 James Madison, Letter to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 346–47 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1901) [hereinafter Madison,
Letter to Washington].
27 The extension of the Clause to require deference to public acts and the implicit exemption
for private bills both reflect a concern with enforcing a coherent and effective nationwide structure for creditor litigation. The provision for public acts requires states (and potentially authorizes
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Finally, this Article shows that the language of the Clause reflects
Madison‘s political theory underlying the Constitution itself. The first
sentence is mandatory because it, like many parts of the Constitution,
was designed to restrict state sovereignty and freedom of action. The
power granted to Congress in the second sentence, however, is discretionary to reflect the fact that Congress, as the supreme lawmaking
power of the nation, not only cannot be forced to take action, but would
also be, Madison expected, the final arbiter of its own obligations under
the Constitution.28 This understanding of congressional constitutional
supremacy, so different from our own, largely explains why Madison
was not troubled by, and appears to have not even noticed, the potential
contradiction between the first and second sentences of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
The question whether Congress can constitutionally pass a law,
like DOMA, which appears to contradict the first sentence of the Clause
makes sense to us because we assume, as the question does, that there is
an authoritative source of constitutional interpretation separate from the
actions of Congress. That authority, of course, is the Supreme Court.
When we ask whether a federal law is unconstitutional, we may not be
asking whether the actual Supreme Court would strike it down, but we
are at least comparing the decision of Congress with an independent
constitutional standard, to be applied by a hypothetical Supreme Court,
most likely one that thinks about constitutional law the way we do. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause appears contradictory to us because we assume both sentences are legal rules that can and must be construed by
an outside legal authority (the Supreme Court) to determine the scope of
congressional authority to prescribe the effects of state laws in other
states. For James Madison in 1787, however, the newly created Supreme Court was a hypothetical institution of unknown effectiveness,
which he hoped would be able to exercise some restraint on state legislation that was in conflict with the new Constitution. 29 He did not conceive that it could or should be an effective check on the federal legislature itself, much less the final arbiter of all constitutional questions. For
Madison, that final arbiter was Congress itself, which was given broad
new powers under the Constitution and whose acts would be the su-

Congress) to apply choice of law rules to ensure that debts incurred in one state are subject to repayment under the same statutory conditions in other states. See infra notes 178–83 and accompanying text. The exemption for private bills prevents debtors who incur large debts in one state
from obtaining a personal legislative discharge of such debts in another. See infra notes 178–83
and accompanying text.
28 See discussion infra Part III.
29 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–74 (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, THE PEOPLE]; Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1044–46 (1997) [hereinafter Rakove, Origins].
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preme law of the land.30 While it is true that the Constitution contained
some theoretical limits on congressional lawmaking power, Madison
was enough of a practical politician and student of political power to
doubt that such theoretical limits could be effective in the absence of
countervailing political forces.31 Accordingly, Madison believed that
congressional restraint ultimately rested on Congress itself, on the national perspective and independence that representatives would gain by
being elected directly by the people, by the need to form large coalitions
to govern effectively and thereby dilute the effect of ―factions,‖ and by
the representatives‘ and senators‘ own sense of honor and political virtue.32 And Madison recognized that the success of such internal restraints was by no means assured.
Seen from this perspective, the potential contradiction between the
first and second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is substantially lessened. The first sentence sets forth a mandatory but somewhat
vague obligation of the states toward one another as coordinate members of a federal union. The second sentence expressly gives the federal
legislature the power to further define and enforce that obligation.
Might Congress misuse the power granted to it under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause? Of course, just like it might misuse many other powers
granted to it to weaken rather than strengthen the federal union. Would
such actions be unconstitutional? From a practical legal or political
perspective, the question was close to meaningless. For Madison in
1787, there was no meaningful distinction between Congress misusing
its constitutional power and Congress acting unconstitutionally. 33 The
real question was whether the language of the Constitution, and their
own sense of political virtue, could normatively constrain Congress
from acting in ways that injured the federal union or permitted states to
violate each other‘s rights.
Nonetheless, there is sufficient evidence of Madison‘s views to
strongly suggest that he would have considered congressional actions to
weaken or abrogate existing obligations of sister-state deference to be
not just unwise and unjust, but subject to condemnation as ―unconstitutional‖ as well. Unlike powers that appropriately belonged to the federal
legislature irrespective of how they were exercised, Madison‘s justification for the powers granted under the second sentence of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause were based on how Madison expected those powers
30
31

See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
The Bill of Rights, which Madison originally opposed and whose effectiveness he always
doubted, had many more such limitations. See RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS 9, 62, 159 (2006); Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the
Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 302–03 (1990).
32 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Strahan, supra note 18, at 63; see also discussion infra Part III.C.
33 See infra notes 282-284 and accompanying text.
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to be used, namely, to ―provide for the harmony and proper intercourse
among the states.‖34 He sought justification for federal legislation permitting judgments obtained in one state to be executed in others, not
based on plenary congressional power to prescribe any rules it wished,
but by ―the nature of the [Federal] Union.‖35 Finally, there is a substantial likelihood that Madison and other Founders believed that some uncertain but significant level of deference to the judgments of sister states
was part of unwritten natural law principles embodied in the law of nations, and that such deference could be increased by legislative enactments, but that any legislative attempt to weaken or abrogate such deference would violate fundamental law.36
What emerges from this analysis is a picture of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause that has significant similarities to the ―one way ratchet‖
interpretation of the Clause that has been used to argue that DOMA is
unconstitutional,37 but one in which the presumed constraints on congressional action are the product of national interest, political virtue,
and natural law, as well as the language of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Madison inserted mandatory language into the first sentence of
the Clause because he wanted it to be a mandatory obligation of the
states created and enforced by the federal government. With respect to
Congress itself, however, Madison believed the first sentence could only function as an instruction to Congress to act properly, in a political
sense, by passing laws necessary to strengthen the federal union, and
refrain from passing laws that weakened or permitted states to weaken
it. The potential inconsistency in the Clause arises only if Congress acts
badly in these Madisonian terms. Although Madison was undoubtedly
aware that such congressional misconduct could occur, he thought that
the danger of such anti-federal actions by a national legislature was
small and certainly far less than leaving the power to prescribe the effects of state judgments to state courts or state legislatures. 38 Moreover,
compared to other types of congressional misconduct that Madison
feared might imperil the union, the likelihood that Congress would pass
34
35
36

THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448.
See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127,
1137–39 (1987); see also discussion infra note 205.
37 The interpretation of the Clause as a ―one way ratchet,‖ was first put forward by Laurence
Tribe and Ralph S. Taylor, Jr., in a letter to Senator Edward Kennedy opposing the Defense of
Marriage Act. It interprets the first sentence of the Clause as establishing a constitutionally mandatory minimum level of state deference toward sister states which can be increased by Congressional action, but not decreased or abrogated by Congress. 142 CONG. REC. S5931 (daily ed. June
6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (reprinting Letter from Laurence Tribe, Professor, Harvard
Law Sch., and Ralph S. Taylor, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Edward M. Kennedy, U.S.
Senator (May 24, 1996)). Tribe and Taylor‘s argument, however, made no reference to historical
materials. This Article demonstrates that such an interpretation has strong support in wellestablished historical sources of the Founding period.
38 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
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laws that abrogated the full faith and credit mandate must have seemed
to Madison to be vanishingly small. In this, of course, Madison was correct. The republic had been in existence for over 200 years before Congress took any such action.39
This Article sets forth the historical bases for this new and somewhat controversial account of Madison‘s Full Faith and Credit Clause. It
consists of three parts. Part I looks at the period immediately prior to the
drafting of the Clause, focusing particularly on the political and legal
controversies surrounding interstate enforcement of debts during this
period, the development of Madison‘s political thought and critique of
existing state legislatures as well as Madison‘s views as expressed in the
major political debates of the first half of the Constitutional Convention.
Part II takes a detailed look at the debates leading to the adoption
of the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause and the historical controversies that have arisen concerning it. It shows that in those debates,
Madison achieved pretty much what he wanted: a somewhat vague but
mandatory obligation on the part of the states to act as part of a coordinated legal system, an obligation that could be ―racheted up‖ over time
through federal legislation.
Part III focuses on the apparent contradiction between the first and
second sentences of the clause and the way that potential contradiction
would have appeared to Madison before the development of judicial review and the establishment of the Supreme Court as final arbiter of constitutional issues.
I. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT BEFORE THE CONSTITUTION
A.

Madison at the Start of the Constitutional Convention

The Full Faith and Credit Clause was a creation of the latter part of
the Constitutional Convention, the months of August and early September 1787, when the great compromises involving power-sharing had
been reached and the Committee on Style was revising and meshing the
various draft proposals of the early Convention into a single coherent
draft of a supreme law for the United States.40 Yet its creation was
strongly influenced by the debates that had preceded it.
39 For that reason, until the passage of DOMA, there was no case law and very little commentary on the meaning or appropriate interpretation of the second sentence of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. See 142 CONG. REC. S5932-33 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (reprinting Letter from Laurence Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., and Ralph S. Taylor,
Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senator (May 24, 1996)); Crane,
Original Understanding, supra note 3, at 311–12.
40 See 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 445–89.
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James Madison came to the Convention probably more prepared
for the job of constitution-making than any other delegate. After attending the College of New Jersey (today, Princeton University), from
which he graduated in two years, Madison served in the Virginia Convention in 1776 and two terms in the Virginia House of Delegates.41 In
1780, he became the youngest member of the Continental Congress, but
―[w]ithin two years, the awkward freshman had become the most effective man in Congress,‖42 and was frequently chosen for service on critical committees.43 His service in Congress had made him acutely aware
of the deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation and he was a leader
in congressional movements to reform them.44
Madison had also conducted his own intellectual study of republican forms of government in both classical and modern times,45 and had
developed a powerful and coherent critique of the deficiencies of the
current American government. This was set forth most clearly and succinctly in a document he wrote in April 1787 (just before the beginning
of the Constitutional Convention) titled Vices of the Political System of
the United States.46
The vices involved were primarily those of the states and state legislatures, which had refused to comply with constitutional requisitions
and were levying customs duties, concluding treaties with the Indians
and usurping other powers of the federal government and failing to
comply with treaties validly made by the United States in accordance
with the law of nations.47 Yet Madison also saw as a central defect of
the current system, the ―trespasses of the states on the rights of each
other,‖ citing these as ―alarming symptoms‖ which may be ―daily apprehended.‖48 Although his first and clearest example is the favoritism
41 Madison began at Princeton in 1769 and graduated in 1771. IRVING BRANT, JAMES
MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REVOLUTIONIST 69, 96 (1941) [hereinafter BRANT, REVOLUTIONIST].
He then stayed an extra half-year, probably for health, but he also continued his studies in law and
languages. Id. at 96–103; KETCHAM, supra note 18, at 51. He served in the Virginia legislature
from 1776–1777, and 1784–1786. See BRANT, REVOLUTIONIST, supra, at 190, 313–15; IRVING
BRANT, JAMES MADISON: THE NATIONALIST 343 (1948) [hereinafter BRANT, NATIONALIST];
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4,
42 n.149 (2001) [hereinafter Kramer, We the Court].
42 BANNING, supra note 15, at 13.
43 Id. at 19.
44 See id. at 43–49; RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 45–47.
45 James Madison, Of Ancient and Modern Confederacies, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 369 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1901) (1787) [hereinafter Madison, Of
Ancient]. Madison apparently prepared these historical notes in the form of a small thirty-page
pamphlet that he intended to carry with him, presumably to the constitutional debates. Id. at 369
n.1.
46 Madison, Vices, supra note 16, at 361.
47 Id. at 361–62.
48 Id. These are ―alarming symptoms‖ presumably, of the breakdown of the federal union. For
a discussion of the interstate economic conflicts existing during the Confederation period, see
Robertson, supra note 24, at 186–91.
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shown by the states to their own citizens in providing port facilities, he
found equally troubling the state laws that interfered with debt collection by out-of-state creditors. As he stated:
Paper money, instalments of debts, occlusion of Courts, making
property a legal tender, may likewise be deemed aggressions on the
rights of other States. As the Citizens of every State aggregately taken stand more or less in the relation of Creditors or debtors, to the
citizens of every other state, Acts of the Debtor state in favor of debtors affect the Creditor State, in the same manner as they do its own
citizens who are relatively creditors toward other citizens. This remark may be extended to foreign nations. If the exclusive regulation
of the value and alloy of coin was properly delegated to the federal
authority, the policy of it equally requires a controul on the States in
the cases above mentioned.49

There is much in this paragraph that is relevant to understanding
Madison‘s approach to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Note first Madison‘s observation—which as we will see was an accurate reflection of
the political realities of the time—that states could be categorized as
relatively pro-debtor or pro-creditor, based presumably on the aggregate
power of those factions on the legislature of the state. Note also his
view that legislative recognition of paper money, installment payments,
and property as legal tender all constituted infringements on the rights
of creditor states, as did limiting the rights of creditors to sue in the
courts of that state. One might, of course, have equally well made the
argument that pro-creditor states like Massachusetts, which required all
debts to be paid in specie, were infringing the rights of debtor states, but
his statement reflects, I believe, a consistent pro-creditor bias in Madison‘s thought, although Madison would more likely have described it as
a concern with protecting the ―vested rights‖ of contractual creditors.50
Moreover, Madison‘s capitalization of ―Acts‖ in ―Acts of the Debtor
states,‖ while not dispositive given the casual approach to spelling at the
time, suggests that Madison was thinking about the ways that legislative
acts of one state could disrupt commercial relations in other states. 51 Finally, Madison points out that an effective federal authority would have
49 Madison, Vices, supra note 16, at 362. As Robertson notes, a loose coalition of ―[m]any
(though not all) merchants, manufacturers and creditors‖ shared an interest in, among other
things, ―protecting commercial credit.‖ Robertson, supra note 24, at 193.
50 Jennifer Nedelsky extensively analyzes the central role that property rights played in Madisonian thought. NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20, at 16–66; see also discussion of
bankruptcy/creditors‘ rights infra Part I.C. As Nedelsky notes, Madison‘s concerns over debtor
relief laws permitting payment of debts in paper money was part of this general concern over
state legislative infringement of property rights. NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20,
at 22–23. A prohibition on states permitting payment of debts in anything but specie was later
incorporated into Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution.
51 See NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20, at 30 (noting that the ―legislative injustice‖ Madison feared most was not direct confiscation, but ―interferences with the security of
expectation and transaction‖).
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a strong incentive to control states that sought to devalue the currency
for repayment of debts, both to preserve American creditworthiness in
foreign commerce and to avoid conflicts among the states.
This in turn points to Madison‘s proposed solution to the vices of
the current system, which is, in short, a more powerful and effective national government. Madison stated plainly that the ―most fatal if not
more frequent cause‖ of these vices ―lies in the people themselves,‖52
particularly in their tendency to form ―factions,‖ which then become a
majority that oppresses a minority or individuals. This tendency toward
faction will be weaker in a large republic, however, than in a small one.
In a large republic, Madison stated, ―[t]he Society becomes broken into
a greater variety of interests, of pursuits of passions, which check each
other, whilst those who may feel a common sentiment have less opportunity of communication and concert.‖53
Yet it is worth noting that Madison does not think that a large republic will eliminate the problem of faction by itself. Rather, he hopes it
will ameliorate the effect of factional interests on legislators sufficiently
so that other more beneficial incentives will motivate those legislators‘
actions. These incentives were concern for the long-term general good,
concerns for justice (which Madison here conflates with religious belief,
while recognizing that religion can also lead to faction), and ―respect for
character,‖ by which Madison apparently meant the desire to enhance
one‘s honor and reputation.54 In illustrating the relative weakness of
such motivations, Madison again used as an illustration the legislative
approval of paper money. He asked, ―[i]s it to be imagined that an ordinary citizen or even Assemblyman of R. Island in estimating the policy
of paper money, ever considered or cared, in what light the measure was
viewed in France or Holland, or even in [Massachusetts] or [Connecticut]?‖55 Madison seemed to imply that paper money would not only be
viewed unfavorably, but as a sign of poor character in all those jurisdictions. Madison concluded that a larger republic must also be joined with
an election process ―as will most certainly extract from the mass of society the purest and noblest characters which it contains.‖56 A change in
the character of the legislators was as important to ameliorating the vices of the system as a change in the governing law.

52
53

Madison, Vices, supra note 16, at 366.
Id. at 368. This of course is the beginning of Madison‘s famous argument, set forth most
memorably in Federalist 10, that a large republic can be a ―remedy‖ for the problem of faction.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
54 Madison, Vices, supra note 16, at 367.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 369.
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“Full Faith and Credit” in the Articles of Confederation

In his discussion of the vices of the current political system, Madison distinguished those actions of the states that clearly violate their obligations under the Articles of Confederation or international law (like
failure to pay requisitions or abide by federal treaty obligations) and
those that occur, at least in part, because of an absence of federal authority (such as failure to require common action on matters of national
importance, or to protect states against internal violence).57 On one important evil of the system, the tendency of states to trespass on each
other‘s rights, Madison did not state whether most such actions violate
the Articles of Confederation, probably because he himself was unsure
of the answer.58
The Articles of Confederation did contain a provision that seemed
to mandate some level of interstate deference, at least with respect to
judicial proceedings. It stated:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each of these States to the
records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates
of every other State.59

The meaning of this provision and particularly the term ―full faith
and credit‖ has been the subject of important recent scholarly work. The
focus of this section, however, will be on a fact that those scholars recognize but whose historical significance, I believe, they do not fully appreciate. That is, that at the time of the Constitutional Convention, the
faith and credit clause in the Articles of Confederation had no clear and
determinate meaning.
The clause was born in confusion. Added as part of a revision of
the Articles that took place in 1777, at the time of its passage, an
amendment was proposed that included not only the ―full faith and credit‖ mandate but explicitly provided that an ―Action of Debt may lie in
the Court of Law in any State for the Recovery of a Debt due on Judgment of any Court in any other State‖ provided that the judgment creditor posted a sufficient bond.60 This provision, which might appear to
57
58

Id. at 363–65.
With regard to one such trespass, the tendency of states to impose tariffs and other restrictions on commerce with other states, Madison does note that it is ―not contrary to the federal articles‖ but is ―certainly adverse to the spirit of the Union.‖ Id. at 363. He makes no similar comment, however, with regard to his other examples, including the ―occlusion of the courts‖ to the
collection of debts.
59 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV. This full faith and credit clause was not
part of the original Articles of Confederation, but was added in November 1777. See Sachs, supra
note 1, at 1223–24. It became effective on March 1, 1781. See Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures
Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1725 (2009).
60 Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 35 (citing 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 887
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create a rule of substantive deference, at least for debt actions, 61 was
voted on separately from the full faith and credit mandate.‖ The full
faith and credit mandate passed, apparently without debate, but the rest
of the provision, as well as a another proposed amendment requiring
that the judgment debtor must have had notice of the ―original writ upon
which judgment shall be founded‖ were defeated.62
One can interpret this muddled history one of three ways. First,
that since the more explicit requirement suggesting substantive deference was voted down, the remaining full faith and credit mandate must
refer only to an evidentiary rule.63 Second, that the rule remained one of
substantive deference, but without express requirements regarding posting of bonds or prior notice. Third, that the rule, intentionally left vague,
signified only that the states owed one another‘s judgments some level
of deference, possibly greater than that which existed between independent nations.
The litigation engendered by the Articles‘ clause reflects all these
differing points of view. There were three reported decisions involving
the Article of Confederation‘s full faith and credit clause decided prior
to the Constitutional Convention.64 Any of the Founders familiar with
them would have concluded, as Madison did, that the Articles‘ clause
was ―extremely indeterminate.‖65
Jenkins v. Putnam was an action for trover in South Carolina for
slaves taken by an American privateer.66 The slaves had been sold in a
prior condemnation proceeding in a North Carolina admiralty court.67
The South Carolina court held that it was ―bound by the sentence of the
Court of Admiralty in North Carolina‖ and that ―[t]he act of confederation is conclusive as to this point, and the law of nations, is equally
strong upon it.‖68
(Worthington Chauncy Ford et al. eds., 1907)).
61 Engdahl believes the provision regarding debt actions still embodies no more than a prima
facie evidentiary rule. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1610. Whitten finds the available historical evidence inconclusive on the point. Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 524–26. Nadelmann, relying largely on the temporal proximity between this proposal and the passage of a
Massachusetts law providing substantive deference for sister state debt actions, leans toward a
substantive deference reading, but ultimately cites Madison, who stated in another context, ―[t]he
truth, perhaps, in this as in many other instances, is, that if the compilers of the text had severally
declared their meanings, these would have been diverse as the comments made upon it.‖ Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 49 (citing Madison‘s Letter to Edmund Randolph (Mar. 10, 1784), in 1
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 66, 67 (1865)).
62 See Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 36.
63 See, e.g., Whitten, FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at 280 n.82; Sachs, supra note 1, at
1224.
64 Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. 1786); Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. 1784).
65 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
66 Jenkins, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 8.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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In James v. Allen, a debtor who had obtained a discharge from imprisonment for a debt in New Jersey sought to use that judgment to obtain a discharge from the same debt in Pennsylvania.69 The common
pleas court held that the order relied on, the discharge from imprisonment, did not go to the ―substance of the . . . demand‖ and had ―no connection with the merits of the cause.‖70 It was a ―private act . . . local in
its nature, and local in its terms,‖ and therefore did not have any effect
in Pennsylvania.71 The court went on to say, however, that the full faith
and credit clause of the Articles seemed ―chiefly intended to oblige each
State to receive the records of another as full evidence of such Acts and
judicial proceedings.‖72

69 James, 1 Dall. at 189. The attorney for the debtor, Thomas Bradford, Jr., then Attorney
General of Pennsylvania (apparently a part time position), and later Attorney General of the United States, USDOJ: AG: ABOUT THE OFFICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistpage.php?id=1 (last
visited July 24, 2011), put forward an original argument that acknowledged, to some degree, the
vagueness and uncertainly surrounding the Article‘s full faith and credit mandate. In response to
the creditor‘s argument that the rule was merely evidentiary, he stated:
But, should the Defendant find no protection under the law of nations, the 4th Article
of the Confederation, effectually supplies that defect. The article declares that ―full
faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial
proceedings, of the Courts and Magistrates of every other State.‖ Now, if a judgment,
or other judicial proceeding in New-Jersey had not been evidence before, this provision
(to the true sense of which the law of Pennsylvania is subservient) would have made it
so—if it was only prima facie evidence before, this would render it conclusive.
James, 1 Dall. at 190. This argument—that the Articles‘ Clause must provide for a somewhat
greater level of deference than exists among independent nations—is one that we will see recurring in debates over the constitutional clause. What is worth noting here is that Bradford‘s argument presupposes substantial uncertainty regarding the level of deference required under the law
of nations as well as under the Articles‘ Clause. William Bradford, Jr., by the way, was a close
friend of Madison‘s from college days. See William Bradford (1755-1795), University of Pennsylvania Archives, http://www.archives.upenn.edu/people/1700s/bradford_wm.html (last visited
July 24, 2011).
70 James, 1 Dall. at 191.
71 Id.
72 Id. 191-92. For Sachs, this language provides the best evidence for his position that the
Articles‘ clause was a pure ―authentication‖ rule, and he quarrels with Engdahl, who sees it as
another example of a prima facie rule. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1588; Sachs, supra note 1, 1226,
1226 n.103. Yet a few paragraphs earlier in the opinion, the Judge also states that ―[t]he Judgment
of a foreign Court establishing a demand against a Defendant, or discharging him from it, according to the laws of that country, would certainly have a binding force here[.]‖ James, 1 Dall. at
191. While this sentence is admittedly dicta, and does not mention the Articles‘ clause, it is hard
to understand how the judge could maintain that foreign judgments have ―binding force‖ but sister state judgments under the Articles merely had to be treated as ―full evidence‖ of the prior proceedings. Id. at 191. I suspect the reason is that Judge Shippen makes the latter comment only
after he has held that the discharge in that case was ―local in its terms‖ and not intended to have
any out of state effects. Id. Accordingly, treating the discharge as authentic, as required by the
Articles‘ clause, does not trigger any obligation to give it out-of-state effect. The earlier sentence,
however, is a general statement under the law of nations concerning the effect of a valid foreign
judgment that would appear to trigger an obligation of ―binding‖ deference. Note, however, that
this obligation under the law of nations does not seem to have been included, much less enhanced, by the Articles‘ clause. In that sense, it is a repudiation of Bradford‘s argument noted
above. See id.
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Finally, in Kibbe v. Kibbe, a Massachusetts creditor brought suit in
Connecticut based on a prior Massachusetts judgment.73 The prior
judgment had been entered by default, based on the attachment of defendant‘s handkerchief, although notice of the action had been served
on defendant‘s home in Connecticut.74 The Superior Court of Connecticut held that the prior judgment was invalid for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that ―the defendant was an inhabitant of the state of
Connecticut, and was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas for the county of Berkshire, at the time of the pretended service of the writ; therefore, the court had no legal jurisdiction of the
cause.‖ It went on to note, however, that:
[F]ull credence ought to be given to judgments of the courts in any of
the United States, where both parties are within the jurisdiction of
such courts at the time of commencing the suit, and are duly served
with the process, and have or might have had a fair trial of the cause;
all which, with the original cause of action, ought to appear by the
plaintiff‘s declaration in action of debt on such judgment.75

This, of course, is dicta, but it makes the court seem at least congenial to applying a rule of substantive deference to out-of-state judgments in cases where there has been appropriate notice and opportunity
to be heard.
So we have three cases construing the Articles‘ full faith and credit
clause in the years preceding the Constitutional Convention. One applies a rule of substantive deference, based on both the clause and admiralty law, but could have relied solely on the latter.76 One holds that the
73
74
75

Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786).
Id. at 126.
Id. The Judge goes on to note:
That the original action was upon a covenant real, and locally annexed where the lands
lie; and the judgment being by default, this court never could take cognizance of or examine into the justice of the cause; therefore, cannot enforce the judgment on which
this action is brought.
Id. Professor Engdahl makes the innovative argument that this language really supports the evidentiary interpretation of the full faith and credit clause, since ―examin[ation] into the justice of
the cause,‖ id., would be appropriate, indeed required, under an evidentiary rule, but not under a
rule of substantive deference. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1615-16. The problem with this interpretation is that the court also specifically states that it is the default judgment that seems to prevent
such examination into the justice of the cause. See Kibbe, 1 Kirby at 126. An evidentiary interpretation would seem to require reexamination of the cause of any prior judgment, default or meritsbased. An alternative interpretation would be that, as the judge noted previously, the only judgments subject to ―full credence‖ [i.e., substantive deference] are those where both parties ―have or
might have had a fair trial of the cause‖ and that examination into the possibility of such a fair
trial is not possible when judgment is entered by default. Id.
It should also be noted that the judge who authored this dicta, Eliphalet Dyer, was a delegate to the Continental Congress in 1777 and voted in favor of the proposed additions to the full
faith and credit clause (substantive deference, notice and bonding), which were ultimately defeated. See Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 36.
76 Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. 1784). Whitten also
points out that the decision can be justified under a view of English law that ―used defensively, all

YABLON.33-1.FINAL FOR PRINT.DOC

144

C A R D OZ O LA W R E V I E W

9/9/2011 6:08 PM

[Vol. 33:1

statute involved had no out-of-state effects, but provides a strong endorsement, in dicta, of the evidentiary interpretation of the clause.77 The
third goes off on jurisdictional grounds, but states that in cases where
the original court had jurisdiction, ―full credence‖ ought to be given to
such judgments.78 I submit that what these precedents really establish is
that at the time of the Constitutional Convention, there was no clear or
well-established legal meaning attached to the full faith and credit
mandate in the Articles of Confederation.79
A slightly broader view of these cases further supports this contention. Such cases are interesting not only for their holdings, but for what
they reveal about what areas of the law were considered settled, and
which were the subjects of ongoing dispute. The level of deference required by the Articles‘ full faith and credit clause clearly falls in the latter category. In the five years it was in effect from 1781 to 1786, it engendered three major cases80 (with two more following in 1788).81 In
each of them the effect of the Articles of Confederation was argued,
with both the evidentiary and substantive interpretations of the rule advanced. It is perhaps significant that in none of these cases do the courts
base their rulings on a straightforward interpretation of the Articles‘
clause. They either avoid the question entirely by relying on jurisdictional or other grounds, or rely equally on principles of comity and the
law of nations. While this could be mere coincidence, I submit it is
more likely a judicial strategy that is still common today. When faced
with a novel and difficult legal issue, judges often choose to avoid it,
either by deciding the case on other grounds, or relying on multiple
foreign judgments were conclusive.‖ Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 536.
77 James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188, 191 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1786).
78 Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786).
79 This is also pretty much the conclusion reached by Nadelmann, Whitten, and Sachs. That
is, that no definitive interpretation of the meaning of the Articles‘ clause can be derived from the
existing case law. See Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 53; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1224–26; Whitten,
State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 540. Only Engdahl maintains that, taken as a whole,
these cases support a ―prima facie rule‖ interpretation of the Articles‘ clause, except for admiralty
cases. Engdahl, supra note 3, at 1618.
80 Jenkins, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 8; James, 1 Dall. at 188; Kibbe, 1 Kirby at 119.
81 The two additional cases were Millar v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa. 1788), and Phelps v. Holker,
1 Dall. 261 (Pa. 1788). In Millar, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied a bankruptcy discharge obtained in Maryland to an action in Pennsylvania, although it did not rely explicitly on
the Articles, but on general principles of justice and the law of nations. 1 Dall. at 229–31. Phelps,
like Kibbe, 1 Kirby at 123, involved a suit to enforce a Massachusetts in rem judgment, though in
Phelps, the matter was the attachment of a blanket. Phelps, 1 Dall. at 261. The Phelps court refused to give the prior judgment conclusive effect, but like Kibbe, 1 Kirby at 121, the holding
seems based primarily on the holding that the Massachusetts court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the debtor or the full amount of the claimed debt. Phelps, 1 Dall. at 263–64. One of the
four judges, however, Atlee, in a concurring opinion, argued that the prior judgment was not
―conclusive evidence‖ by adverting to the provisions of the Articles which had been defeated in
1777. Id. at 261; see also Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, 410 (Mass. 1805) (Sedgwick, J.) (criticizing Judge Atlee‘s argument in Phelps).
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grounds for their decision. It seems likely that the ―correct‖ interpretation of the Articles‘ full faith and credit clause was considered just such
a novel and difficult legal issue.
The fact that distinguished lawyers were willing to argue both
sides of this issue is further evidence that the meaning of ―full faith and
credit‖ was far from clear or settled prior to the Constitutional Convention. While lawyers are of course paid to argue for their clients, it seems
unlikely that most lawyers then, or now, would choose to make arguments which they felt the authorities they cited could not support, or
which might injure their reputation as reliable and knowledgeable jurists. In that regard, it is interesting that Jared Ingersoll, one of the leading attorneys in Philadelphia (and a delegate to the Constitutional Convention) argued in James in 1786 for the evidentiary interpretation of
the Articles‘ clause,82 and two years later, in Millar v. Hall83 and Phelps
v. Holker,84 argued that the clause created a rule of substantive deference. The meaning of the clause, in short, was a litigable issue, one on
which competent authorities and respectable arguments could be found
for either side.85
It is also worth examining these cases to see what relationship they
assume exists between the Articles‘ clause and the deference obligations
for foreign judgments created under the law of nations. In Jenkins, the
Articles‘ clause and the law of nations are said to constitute two independent and equally strong grounds for a rule of substantive deference,
at least in admiralty cases.86 In James, in contrast, the rule of substantive deference that exists for some foreign judgments under the law of
nations does not appear to have been incorporated in any way into the
Articles‘ clause, which remains a pure evidentiary rule.87 Kibbe relies
on general principles of jurisdiction, which are presumably derived

82
83
84
85

James, 1 Dall. at 191.
Millar, 1 Dall. at 231.
Phelps, 1 Dall. at 262.
Nadelmann offers one further piece of evidence of the indeterminacy with which the Confederation‘s clause was viewed. He tells us of a committee of the Continental Congress which, on
August 22, 1781, (shortly after Maryland‘s ratification made the Articles effective) reported that
the Confederation required ―execution‖ in among others, the following respect: ―By declaring the
method of exemplifying records and the operation of the Acts and judicial proceedings of the
Courts of one State contravening those of the States in which they are asserted . . . .‖ Nadelmann,
supra note 3, at 53 n.95. Nadelmann accurately notes that this shows, at least, that ―the drafters
saw two different problems in need of clarification, one formal, the method of exemplification,
and the other substantive, the effect of a foreign judgment or proceeding.‖ Id. It is also worth noting that two of the three members of that committee, Oliver Ellsworth and Edmund Randolph,
were both distinguished lawyers and future delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Id.; see
also 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789 894 (Worthington C. Ford et al.
eds., 1904–37).
86 Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8, 8–9 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. 1784).
87 See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
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from the law of nations, but makes no mention of the Articles‘ clause.88
In short, the question of the relationship between the Articles‘ clause
and the deference obligations under the law of nations is at least as opaque and uncertain as the extent of the deference obligation under the
clause itself.
As a final proof of the indeterminacy of the Article‘s full faith and
credit clause, we can return to James Madison and his retrospective
comments in Federalist No. 42, the only place in The Federalist Papers
where the Full Faith and Credit Clause (both that of the Constitution
and of the Articles) is discussed. With respect to the Articles‘ clause,
Madison tells us, ―[t]he meaning of the [Articles‘ full faith and credit
clause] is extremely indeterminate, and can be of little importance under
any interpretation which it will bear.‖89
With respect to the first part of Madison‘s statement, the ―extreme
indeterminacy‖ of the clause,90 we have seen that it is a well-supported
and justifiable position. His claim that it can be of ―little importance‖
under any reasonable interpretation may reflect, in part, the fact that he
is dealing in The Federalist Papers with the most profound questions of
political theory as they apply to the future of his country. The choice between a rule of evidentiary or substantive deference for out-of-state
judgments may appear like very small potatoes in such circumstances.91
But we know that Madison did not take the problem of states‘ interference with one another lightly. Part of the problem was that a rule limited to judgments was too narrow for the kind of interstate coordina88 Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786). Similarly, Millar v. Hall relies
heavily, explicitly and primarily on the law of nations, with only one minor nod to the ―reciprocal
obligation of the states under the articles of confederation,‖ which are presumed to conform to
these principles of ―general conveniency, expediency, justice, and humanity.‖ 1 Dall. at 232. Finally, Phelps v. Holker, which also goes off on jurisdictional grounds, gives us four separate judicial opinions, one (Bryan) based solely on Massachusetts law, another (Atlee) based on a historical interpretation of the enactment of the Articles‘ Clause, and two (M‘Kean and Rush) which
seem to imply at least that the Articles‘ Clause does not provide conclusive out-of-state effect to
judgments issued in rem. 1 Dall. at 261-64.
89 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
90 Id.
91 Whitten finds it ―highly unlikely‖ that a rule of conclusive deference could be considered
by Madison to be of ―little importance.‖ Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 554.
Yet to make this argument one has to believe that a rule of conclusive deference was not even
considered by Madison a plausible interpretation of the Articles‘ clause, something belied by the
case law under the Articles, as well as by Madison‘s own statements. Far more likely was that
Madison believed that neither a prima facie nor a conclusive rule of deference were particularly
effective in enforcing debt obligations. After all, even under the evidentiary interpretation of the
clause, proof of the existence of the prior judgment was enough to establish a prima facie case.
For debtors who defaulted or had no defense on the merits, the difference was indeed of ―little
importance.‖ Id. It should also be noted that the default rates in eighteenth century American litigation were extremely high. In her study of colonial litigation in New York Supreme Court, Deborah Rosen found that by the 1750s, the default rate in cases in New York County was approximately sixty percent. For other New York counties it averaged eighty-four percent. See Rosen,
Supreme Court, supra note 12, at 213, 230.
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tion he sought. It did not, for example, deal with laws providing for repayment of debts with paper money, or the effects of various bankruptcy laws on prior debts. The most pressing problem he saw, however,
was that under either a prima facie or conclusive rule, the need to institute an additional action gave the defaulting debtor a chance to escape
across state lines. For Madison, the truly effective and sensible solution
is one that provided for execution of out-of-state judgments. That was
the power Madison sought for Congress and was the ―power here established‖ by the second sentence of the Clause, which he goes on to state
may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and maybe
particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the
effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated at
any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction.92

Although the precise meaning of the Articles‘ clause remains uncertain, we can get a better understanding of the constitutional clause by
examining it in relation to Madison‘s broader normative goals at the
time of the Founding. That is the task of the next two sections.
C.

Economic Implications of Full Faith and Credit

We have seen that at the time of the Founding, the issue of interstate deference to judgments was closely intertwined with the enforcement and collection of interstate debts. Recall that this was a primary
focus of Madison‘s concerns about interstate trespasses—the way in
which pro-debtor states created laws that interfered with the proper collection of debts by out-of-state creditors.93 More broadly, the full faith
and credit clause in the Articles of Confederation was about enforcement of out-of-state court judgments, and court judgments, in eighteenth-century America, predominantly involved the results of debtorcreditor litigation.94 The reported cases under the Articles‘ full faith and

92
93
94

THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
As Bruce Mann notes, the debtor-creditor relationship in the late eighteenth century ―was a
legal one, defined by the formal rules that governed the creation and collection of debts.‖ BRUCE
MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 33
(2002). Deborah Rosen, in her study of colonial New York courts, found that ―[l]egal practice of
the period from 1690 to 1760 evolved in the way it did because debt litigation increasingly dominated the courts‘ dockets as New York became a more commercialized society.‖ Deborah Rosen,
Courts and Commerce in Colonial New York, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 139, 151 (1992) [hereinafter Rosen, Courts and Commerce]. Rosen also found that this increase in debt litigation was accompanied by very high rates of default judgments. Id. at 153. While there were many reasons for
this high default rate, at least one of them is directly relevant to Madison‘s concerns: the likelihood of insolvent debtors ―fleeing to another colony where distance and procedural rules made
arrest unlikely.‖ MANN, supra, at 26.
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credit clause are consistent with Madison‘s economic concerns. Of the
five, four involve suits for unpaid debts.95
The post-revolutionary period was also a time of serious economic
depression.96 Defaults by debtors frequently caused ―credit cascades‖ as
those to whom payment was due also became unable to pay their
debts.97 These private debt collection problems and the economic hardships they created were also associated in the mind of many with the
problem of public debt and the inability or unwillingness of many states
to pay their fair share of the debts incurred by the United States during
the Revolutionary War.98 Moreover, these credit problems gave rise to
serious civil unrest among agrarian debtors in various parts of the country, unrest that manifested itself most dramatically in Shays‘s Rebellion
in western Massachusetts.99
The states‘ legislative response to these issues was a matter of deep
concern to Madison. He strongly condemned states that enacted ―tender
laws‖ requiring creditors to accept paper money at face value in satisfaction of debts.100 Recall also Madison‘s complaint about state laws
that made ―property a legal tender‖ as one of the ways in which states
were infringing on the rights of other states.101 In contrast, the most con95 Of those, two involve efforts by Massachusetts creditors to enforce that state‘s strict (and to
modern sensibilities somewhat strange) statute which provided that, under appropriate circumstances, attachment of a small personal item like a blanket or handkerchief of the out-of-state debtor would subject the debtor to personal jurisdiction for the full amount of the claimed debt. See
Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 119 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall. 261, 261
(Pa. 1788); Sachs, supra note 1, at 1236.
The two others represent attempts to give out-of-state effect to statutes passed in other
states to give some protection to insolvent debtors within those states. See Millar v. Hall, 1 Dall.
229, 261 (Pa. 1788); Jenkins v. Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8, 8 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess.
1784). They can all reasonably be seen as clashes in the battle Madison described between procreditor and pro-debtor states.
96 Terry Bouton, Moneyless in Pennsylvania: Privatization and the Depression of the 1780s,
in THE ECONOMY OF EARLY AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 218
(Cathy Matson ed., 2006); Cathy Matson, The Revolution, The Constitution, and New Nation, in 1
THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 363, 372–82 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 1996). Paper money issued by states during the war rapidly diminished in value, trade with the West Indies had been disrupted, debts incurred during the war,
both private and public were coming due, and American manufactures were being undercut by
British imports and the economy generally was contracting. MANN, supra note 94, at 170–71;
Matson, supra at 372–83.
97 MANN, supra note 94, at 19–20.
98 See Madison, Vices, supra note 16, at 362.
99 MANN, supra note 94, at 180–81. Unrest among agrarian debtors was far from limited to
Massachusetts. In 1787, Madison was informed by correspondents that ―much the same materials
were on the verge of conflagration in the Old Dominion.‖ BANNING, supra note 15, at 122; see
also WOOD, THE CREATION, supra note 16, at 404; Robert A. Feer, Shay’s Rebellion and the
Constitution, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 388 (1969).
100 MANN, supra note 94, at 172–75.
101 In 1782, the Virginia Assembly passed a law permitting debts to be paid in hemp, tobacco,
and flour, with the county courts determining their value. Slightly later legislation also permitted
payment by title to land or slaves. A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN
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sistently pro-creditor state was Massachusetts, where Boston merchants
dominated the legislature and whose law required all taxes and private
debts to be paid in specie.102 It also appears that litigation to recover
debts was slow, expensive, and uncertain, casting disrepute on both the
state courts and the lawyers who practiced before them.103
States also potentially interfered with debt obligations in other
states through insolvency and bankruptcy statutes. The three decades
prior to the Constitutional Convention were a period of experimentation
in many colonies (later states) concerning ―new statutory schemes for
discharging debts as well as debtors.‖104 Although these statutes were
generally ―short lived or restrictive in their application,‖ 105 they
represented a growing tendency to view insolvency not as an individual
moral failing but as an economic problem requiring a public response.106
Madison had long recognized the critical role that economic concerns played in safeguarding the political and moral well-being of the
nation.107 His temperament, his class, and his experience in the Virginia
state legislature all inclined him against legislation that he perceived as
designed to relieve citizens of their rightful obligations to their creditors.108 It would be a mistake, however, to view the opposition of Madison to tender laws and similar legislation as simply based on economic
or class concerns. He saw them as fundamentally unfair and violations

LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680–1810, at 171 (1981).
102 MANN, supra note 94, at 180. Feer makes the interesting observation that among Madison
and other Federalists, Massachusetts was frequently cited as a model worthy of emulation, while
Rhode Island (which in addition to being pro-debtor had not sent delegates to the Convention),
was generally referred to with disdain. Feer, supra note 99, at 410.
103 MANN, supra note 94, at 20–24, 32–33. Mann also notes that while the actual legal process
of enforcing and collecting debts changed little throughout the eighteenth century, states varied
greatly in their attitudes toward debt collection and debtor relief. MANN, supra note 94, at 31–32.
104 MANN, supra note 94, at 55–77.
105 Id. at 55.
106 The state with the longest and most consistent policy of debtor relief was Rhode Island,
which developed a system whereby debtors could discharge their debts (and avoid debtors‘ prison) by petitioning the legislature. Peter J. Coleman, The Insolvent Debtor in Rhode Island 1745–
1828, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 413, 415–16 (1965). The petition was to be accompanied by a list of
the all the debtors‘ assets. If the petition was granted (which was done by a special act of the legislature) a commission, acting on the legislature‘s behalf, took the debtor‘s property and distributed it pro-rata to his creditors. Id. at 415–16; see also Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 55 nn.102 &
103 (description of Connecticut‘s laws regarding discharge of debtors). We have seen that the
effect such discharges had on out-of-state creditors was the issue in two of the five reported cases
under the Articles‘ clause. See James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786); Jenkins v.
Putnam, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 8 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. 1784). It was also to be an issue in
the debates over the constitutional Clause. See discussion infra Part I.C.
107 BANNING, supra note 15, at 48–49.
108 RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 54. He was quite pleased, for example, in having
prevented the Virginia legislature from passing any bills providing for payment of debts with paper money. BANNING, supra note 15, at 97–99.
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of natural rights of contract and property. 109 For Madison, the protection
of property and contract rights was a basic principle of justice,110 which
it was an obligation of a ―well constructed Union‖ to safeguard. 111 But
he also saw the protection of these rights not just as a benefit to the
propertied classes, but as a necessary prerequisite for a stable economic
system and, therefore, a safeguard of the nation‘s economic well being.112 Central to protecting such rights was a swift and fair system for
the administration of justice. As Madison stated in 1788:
Compare the situations of nations in Europe, where the justice is administered with celerity, to that of those where it is refused, or administered tardily. Confidence produces the best effects in the former.
The establishment of confidence will raise the value of property, and
relieve those who are so unhappy as to be involved in debts.113

Madison at the start of the Constitutional Convention had a rather
clear idea of the economic goals of the new federal system he was hoping to create. It was one that would safeguard and enforce property
rights in accordance with principles of natural justice and sound governance. Yet Madison was well aware that while such principles might
represent ―fundamental law‖ in some theoretical sense, it was far from
clear how such rights could be protected from short-sighted state legislators, who had little regard for preservation of contract rights generally
and even less for those of out-of-state creditors.114 His most basic answer was a structural one, the creation of a larger federal government
whose members would have a national perspective, and could thereby
function as a disinterested ―umpire‖ between state interests.115 Since, on
109
110

See WOOD, THE CREATION, at 405–07.
See NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20, at 28–29, 31–38. Much later in his
life, Madison would described this property right in Lockean terms, stating, ―[t]he personal right
to acquire property, which is a natural right, give to property, when acquired, a right to protection,
as a social right.‖ James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention (Dec. 2,
1829), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 361 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons
1910).
111 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20, at 28–30.
112 NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, supra note 20, at 25–28, 40–42.
113 James Madison, Speech to Virginia Constitutional Convention on the Power of the Judiciary (June 20, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 216, 225 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P.
Putnam‘s Sons 1904). Madison‘s precise topic was the Constitution‘s creation of federal diversity
jurisdiction in Article III, but as usual, Madison saw the issue in broader terms. Id. at 217.
114 The problem of how to safeguard fundamental rights from legislative fiat was a central
problem for eighteenth century American political thought. See WOOD, THE CREATION, supra
note 16, at 273–82. Wood analyzes the problem as rooted in an ambiguity in the concept of law
that existed among Americans of the period. See id. at 291–94. A ―confusion‖ existed between
―the colonists‘ resort to written documents and charters as the best means of defending liberties‖
and an older conception of law as ―those rights which we are entitled to by the eternal laws of
right reason.‖ Id. at 292–94. Madison certainly retained this older notion of fundamental law in
his account of property and contract rights, and, as we will see, it also played a major role in the
formation of the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause.
115 Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 26, at 346.
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Madison‘s view, the interests of the nation as a whole were always for
the protection and fair and uniform enforcement of contract and property rights, giving the federal government power to foster protection of
such rights, and depriving states of the power to interfere with them,
would be a major achievement. Not only did he expect the federal government to preserve these existing rights, including the obligation on the
part of each state to enforce the debt obligations created in other states
in accordance with their terms, but they could even be empowered to
improve the efficiency and consistency with which those rights were enforced by providing for the execution of judgments obtained in one state
in the courts of another.116
D.

Full Faith and Credit and the Structure of the New Federal Union

Although inconsistent debt enforcement was the practical problem
Madison associated most closely with the constitutional Full Faith and
Credit Clause, Madison did not view the Clause, or the relationship
among states generally, solely from a narrow economic perspective. Rather it was part of a broader effort to foster ―harmony and proper intercourse among the states.‖117 By the time of the Convention, Madison
had developed fairly specific proposals to remedy the defects of the Articles of Confederation.118 To prevent the states from ―molesting‖ one
another and other detrimental effects of ill-advised state laws, Madison
proposed a simple but powerful solution—a federal ―negative,‖ a federal veto power over any and all state legislation.119 An important justifi116
117
118

See discussion infra Part II.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
Banning comments that Madison was the ―best prepared of all who gathered for the Federal Convention.‖ BANNING, supra note 15, at 115; see also WOOD, THE CREATION, supra note 16,
at 472.
119 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19 [18], 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 324, 327 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1901) [hereinafter Madison, Letter to Jefferson]. While this may seem like a vast expansion of federal power relative to
the states, Madison saw it as limited, defensive and necessary. In a letter to George Washington
dated April 16, 1787, Madison laid out a vision of a newly created federal government whose
positive lawmaking powers would only be expanded to ―all cases which require uniformity‖ such
as regulation of foreign trade and naturalization, but which would have the power to exercise a
negative ―in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the states, as heretofore exercised by
the kingly prerogative.‖ Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 26, at 345 (emphasis in original).
Madison states this would be ―absolutely necessary‖ but also the ―least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions.‖ Id.; see also BANNING, supra note 15, at 117–18. Madison made
similar arguments in a speech to the Constitutional Convention on June 8, 1787. 1 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 164 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter 1 Farrand]. He
reasoned that this was a merely ―defensive power‖ but one without which ―[t]he states will continue to invade the National jurisdiction, to violate treaties and the law of nations & harass each
other with rival and spiteful measure . . . .‖ Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 26, at 345.
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cation for this proposal was Madison‘s belief that the federal government could function as a neutral arbiter among interests and factions,
both within and among the states.120 Madison‘s concept of a ―federal
negative‖ did not survive beyond the early weeks of the Constitutional
Convention,121 but his vision of the federal government as a neutral arbiter among the states remained.
The concerns of small states that they would be dominated by the
larger ones developed into the central problem of the Convention.122 In
his efforts to convince the smaller states that a large, proportionatelybased national government was in their own best interests, Madison expanded on his idea of a federal government, with concurrent powers derived from the people,123 as a neutral arbiter among states. Perhaps the
most dramatic events of the Convention came on June 18 and 19, 1787,
in response to the recently proposed ―New Jersey Plan.‖124 Alexander
120

As he stated in a letter to George Washington:
The great desideratum which has not yet been found for Republican Governments
seems to be some disinterested & dispassionate umpire in disputes between different
passions & interests in the State. The majority who alone have the right of decision,
have frequently an interest, real or supposed in abusing it. In Monarchies the sovereign
is more neutral to the interests and views of different parties; but unfortunately he too
forms interests of his own repugnant to those of the whole. Might not the national prerogative here suggested be found sufficiently disinterested for the decision of local
questions of policy, whilst it would itself be sufficiently restrained from the pursuit of
interests adverse to those of the whole Society. There has not been any moment since
the peace at which the representatives of the Union would have given an assent to paper money or any other measure of a kindred nature.
Id. at 346–47. We see here a slight modification of Madison‘s argument for a large republic. Rather than simply argue that such a government will be too varied and diverse to be easily captured
by any one faction, Madison here argues that the national government, by its very nature, will
tend toward a neutral and positive role in resolving conflicts among factions and smaller political
entities. As he says, a national government will be ―disinterested‖ on ―local questions of policy‖
and would therefore exercise a veto power only when it benefited the interests of ―the whole Society‖ such as to prevent his old bugaboo, the institution of paper money. See BANNING, supra
note 15, at 141 (Madison recognized need to defend ―peaceable relations between the states from
independent, countervailing state decision‖).
121 On June 8 and 9, 1787, a proposal to expand the power of the federal negative from state
laws contravening the articles of union or treaties made under them to ―all laws which to them
shall appear improper‖ was defeated, primarily by opposition of the smaller states. 1 Farrand,
supra note 119, at 162–68. Madison‘s protestations notwithstanding, it seemed to most delegates
an enormous and potentially unrestrained expansion of national power at the expense of the
states, particularly the smaller states, and it certainly did not help that it was strongly reminiscent
of a power previously exercised by the English monarch.
122 See BANNING, supra note 15, at 145–57; MILLER, supra note 16, at 67–73; RAKOVE,
MADISON, supra note 17, at 65, 69.
123 A central organizing principle that developed in the early days of the Convention was that
the powers of the national government should be derived from the people through an electoral
process, not, as with the Articles, indirectly through the action of state governments. See 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 21; see also BANNING, supra note 15, at 119.
124 The New Jersey Plan, proposed by Robert Paterson of New Jersey in opposition in to the
Virginia Plan, basically called for an expanded version of the Articles of Confederation government, with some expansion of federal powers, but preserving the one state–one vote rule for the
national assembly. See BANNING, supra note 15, at 149.
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Hamilton, giving his first significant speech of the Convention, argued,
in effect, for the abolition of state sovereignty.125
After Hamilton‘s radical proposal, Madison‘s remarks the following day seem conciliatory and moderate. He focused again on the inadequacies of the current confederation, including its failure to prevent
the ―trespasses of the states on each other,‖126 but warned that a failure
of the Convention to preserve the union would result in far greater calamity to the smaller states, who would then be at the mercy of their
larger neighbors.127
Here again we see Madison‘s belief that a national government
would have an ―equal interest‖ in protecting every part of the nation
against every other. The argument may have backfired, however, with
some delegates who interpreted it as meaning the national government
would be indifferent to individual states and state boundaries, viewing
them as ―mere counties‖ with few rights or interests of their own.128
While this is a misreading of Madison‘s position, the element of truth in
it is the association in Madison‘s mind of two concepts: the functioning
of the states as administrative units of the national government and the
national government‘s neutrality among those states.129
These broader structural concerns underlie Madison‘s proposals for
the specific language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and particular125 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 283 (speech of Alexander Hamilton on June 18, 1787, stating
he was ―fully convinced, that no amendment of the confederation, leaving the States in possession
of their sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose [of the Convention]‖). Hamilton suggested
that ―great economy‖ could be obtained by substituting a general government for those of the
states, whose form might be maintained solely for the purpose of ―local‖ ―tribunals‖ and similar
subordinate functions. Id. at 287; see also RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 68.
126 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 317.
127 If the union dissolved he asked, ―would the small States be more secure agst. the ambition
& power of their larger neighbours, than they would be under a general Government pervading
with equal energy every part of the Empire, and having an equal interest in protecting every part
agst. every other part?‖ 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 320.
128 This is how Madison‘s remarks of June 28, 1787, were sometimes understood, as he argued
again in defense of a proportionately elected national government:
In a word; the two extremes before us are a perfect separation & a perfect incorporation, of the 13 States. In the first case they would be independent nations subject to no
law, but the law of nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one common law. In the first case the smaller states would have
every thing to fear from the larger. In the last they would have nothing to fear. The true
policy of the small States therefore lies in promoting those principles & that form of
Govt. which will most approximate the States to the condition of Counties.
1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 449. Of course, Madison is speaking here of an ―extreme‖ position,
not the one he was actually advocating.
129 The more states promote ―principles‖ which cause them to approximate ―the condition of
Counties,‖ the more equally and neutrally state borders will be treated by the national government
and the less they will have to fear from the larger states. Although Madison had not completely
abandoned his hope for a federal negative on state legislation, he was relying more and more on
the concept of concurrent jurisdiction to justify independent assertions of federal power and exclude state participation in enforcement of federal laws. See 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 447;
BANNING, supra note 15, at 155.
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ly his insistence on the powers granted in the second sentence of the
Clause, the part that made it an ―improvement‖ over the Articles‘
clause.130 This was not, as some have recently suggested, simply a matter of ―punting the ball‖ to the federal legislature in the face of some
disagreement over the proper interpretation of legal terms.131 Rather, it
was a grant of federal power designed by Madison and his allies to
achieve very specific ends, the creation of far greater interstate deference obligations, such as interstate execution of judgments, than existed under current law or could appropriately be set forth as constitutional mandates. Because a high degree of interstate deference, protecprotection of vested property and contract rights from state interference,
and a uniform and effective system for enforcement of such rights were
all, in Madison‘s view, clearly in the national interest, a grant of power
to the federal legislature to define and enforce the full faith and credit
obligation would necessarily lead to a strengthening and expansion of
that obligation.132 How Madison sought to draft the new Full Faith and
Credit Clause to bring about such results is the subject of the next section.
II. CREATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
CLAUSE
A.

Sources of the Clause

On July 24, 1787, the Constitutional Convention appointed a fiveman Committee of Detail to prepare a draft constitution that encompassed the results of deliberations up to that point.133 The Committee of
Detail was chaired by John Rutledge of South Carolina, and also included Edmund Randolph of Virginia, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut,
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts.134
There is no indication that any discussion of the full faith obligation took place at the Convention prior to that time, nor is it mentioned
in the hotly debated proposals that became known as the Virginia and

130
131
132

THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1623–24.
See discussion supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. While historians still debate the
extent to which Madison in 1787 sought to transform the United States into a cohesive national
entity at the expense of the states, it is clear that he expected the new national government to
make many changes to strengthen the national interest. See RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at
76–77.
133 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 97.
134 Id.; 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at xxii.
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New Jersey Plans.135 Rather, it appears to have made its way to the
Committee of Detail through the alternative proposal by Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, who submitted a plan to the Convention on May
29, 1787,136 which had a significant number of borrowings from the Articles of Confederation, and which appears, based on notes and papers
of James Wilson,137 to have been taken up and considered in the work of
the Committee of Detail.138
A version of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was in the draft constitution submitted to the Convention by the Committee on Detail on
August 6,139 although the Convention did not get around to discussing it
until August 29.140 Given this delay, and the carefully drafted alternative
proposals submitted on August 29, it seems likely that the draft was
subject to substantial informal discussions by delegates in the three
weeks prior to its formal consideration.141
Proposed Article XVI of the draft stated, ―[f]ull faith shall be given
in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the records and judi-

135 See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 593–94, 611–16 (Max
Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter 3 Farrand].
136 1 Farrand, supra note 119, at 16.
137 A copy of what appears to have been the Pinckney Plan was found among James Wilson‘s
papers relating to the work of the Committee on Detail. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 134–35, 134
n.3. In its outline of proposed articles for the new constitution it included as point 3, ―Mutual Intercourse —Community of Privileges — Surrender of Criminals — Faith to Proceedings &c.‖ Id.
at 135. These subjects, substantially elaborated, appear to have formed the basis for Articles XIII
through XVI of the draft constitution presented by the Committee on Detail on August 6, 1787.
See id. at 183–88.
138 Alexander Hamilton also submitted a constitutional plan on June 18, 1787, in conjunction
with his controversial speech. The eleven points of that proposal and its variants do not mention a
full faith and credit obligation. See VARIANT TEXTS OF THE PLAN PRESENTED BY ALEXANDER
HAMILTON TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION – TEXT. A, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/
hamtexta.asp (last visited July 25, 2011); VARIANT TEXTS OF THE PLAN PRESENTED BY
ALEXANDER
HAMILTON
TO
THE
FEDERAL
CONVENTION
–
TEXT.
B,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtextb.asp (last visited July 25, 2011); VARIANT
TEXTS OF THE PLAN PRESENTED BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION –
TEXT. C, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtextc.asp (last visited July 25, 2011);
VARIANT TEXTS OF THE PLAN PRESENTED BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION – TEXT. D, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtextd.asp (last visited July
25, 2011); VARIANT TEXTS OF THE PLAN PRESENTED BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION – TEXT. E, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtexte.asp (last
visited July 25, 2011). However, an expanded version of Hamilton‘s plan, recorded in Madison‘s
notes as ―communicated‖ to Madison by Colonel Hamilton, at ―about the close of the Convention
in Philadelphia, 1787‖ does contain such a provision, Article IX, Section 5, which states in part:
―full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of another.‖ See 3 Farrand, supra note 135, at 617, 629. Given the timing and limitations on
its distribution, it is hard to see how Hamilton‘s language could have influenced the drafting of
the Clause at the Convention, except possibly indirectly through the comments of Madison himself.
139 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 176.
140 Id. at 445.
141 Engdahl makes a similar observation. See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1622.
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cial proceedings of the Courts and Magistrates of every other State.‖142
The language is close, but not identical to, the full faith and credit
clause in the Articles of Confederation.143 The major change is the extension of full faith not just to records and judicial proceedings but to
―acts of the Legislatures.‖144 Moreover, the term ―full faith and credit‖
in the Articles has been abridged to ―full faith.‖
B.

Evidentiary vs. Substantive Deference and Beyond

The discussion on August 29, 1787, began with a question by Williamson, a non-lawyer,145 who, apparently happy with the Articles‘
clause, wanted to know the meaning of the new proposed provision.146
Wilson and Johnson, ―expert lawyers‖ both,147 replied in part that they
―supposed the meaning to be that Judgments in one State should be the
ground of actions in other States.‖148 This response, as prior commentators have noted, is almost as vague as the draft clause itself. It could be
taken as a statement of a prima facie rule, a rule of substantive deference, or an indeterminate response vague enough to encompass either.149 Wilson and Johnson‘s statement does indicate, however, that the
Clause was assumed to require that out-of-state judgments be given

142
143
144

2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 188.
Cf. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV.
The inclusion of records and judicial proceedings of ―magistrates‖ as well as courts may
have represented another expansion. While magistrates were often lower level court officers, like
justices of the peace, the eighteenth century term was also used to refer to high officers of the
executive branch charged with carrying out the laws. In the constitutional debates themselves, the
term ―chief magistrate‖ was often applied to the president and governors were also chief magistrates of their states. See WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, 1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 545–46 (1953). In any event, the term did not make it into
the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause.
145 Hugh Williamson of North Carolina was a physician with strong interests in the natural
sciences. He was an ardent federalist, but had no legal training. See DELEGATES TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION:
HUGH
WILLIAMSON,
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/delegates/williamson.html (last visited July 26,
2011). Accordingly, it seems likely that his question and suggestion to retain the wording of the
Articles was not based on any strong attachment to the Articles‘ clause, but simply a reflection of
his own curiosity (and seems to have been answered in that spirit).
146 The statement in Madison‘s notes is: ―Mr. Williamson moved to substitute in place of it,
the words of the Articles of Confederation on the same subject. He did (not) understand precisely
the meaning of the article.‖ 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 447.
147 Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 56, 56 n.108.
148 Id. at 54 (quoting 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 447). According to Madison‘s notes, Wilson
and Johnson then added, ―& that acts of the Legislatures should be included, [as they sometime
serve the like purpose as act] for the sake of Acts of insolvency &c —.‖ 2 Farrand, supra note 1,
at 447. The significance of the extension of the clause to legislative acts is discussed below.
149 Given the nature of the debate that developed on this issue on August 29, I think it most
likely that Wilson and Johnson intended to tentatively suggest a rule of substantive deference, at
least in some cases, while recognizing the uncertainties and complications of existing law.
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some effect in actual litigation, and therefore excludes a purely formal
evidentiary meaning.
Although prior commentators have sought to find a basis for
choosing between a prima facie and substantive interpretation of Wilson
and Johnson‘s statement,150 a vaguely ambiguous response most accurately reflected contemporary legal understandings.151 Wilson and Johnson‘s use of the verb ―supposed‖ is also interesting. It surely reflects, in
part, these lawyers‘ recognition that the equivalent term in the Articles
was uncertain and controversial, and thus, even expert lawyers could
not state definitively what the term in the new Constitution would
mean.152
Yet the controversy that actually arose on August 29, 1787, did not
involve choosing between a rule of prima facie or substantive deference,
but a choice between two versions of substantive deference obligations,
one static and one dynamic. The dynamic conception of the rule was
Madison‘s. He declared himself in favor of committing to the Article,
but presented the Convention with a vision of a more integrated and
tightly coordinated legal system for enforcement of out-of-state judgments. He ―wished the Legislature might be authorized to provide for
the execution of Judgments in other States, under such regulations as
might be expedient‖ and argued that this was ―justified by the nature of
the Union.‖153
150 Whitten takes it as indicative of a non-conclusive (i.e., prima facie) rule. Whitten, StateCourt Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 549. He argues that since Wilson and Johnson viewed sister
state judgments ―only as grounds for action,‖ not a conclusive basis for a judgment, their comment is more consistent with a prima facie rule, while admitting his conclusion is open to doubt.
Id. at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Laycock, supra note 3, at 292 (referring to
―Johnson‘s clear explanation‖). Engdahl argues that Wilson and Johnson‘s statement ―ought not
to have troubled‖ those who understood the Clause as invoking only a prima facie rule, but acknowledges that a rule of substantive deference was ―an arguable position‖ at this time and one
that would ―excite concern‖ if applied to statutes. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1621.
151 It is surely possible that, in response to a question from a non-lawyer, Wilson and Johnson
felt no need to expand upon the technical controversies that had arisen regarding the precise
meaning of the Articles‘ Clause, especially since Williamson‘s question appears to have been
directed primarily at the big change from the Articles‘ clause, the inclusion of ―acts of the legislatures‖ under the full faith obligation.
152 It is also possible that Wilson and Johnson‘s statement (and perhaps even Williamson‘s
seemingly naive question) had been prepared in advance to emphasize the indeterminate nature of
both the Articles and proposed constitutional Clause. Note that the language of both alternative
clauses proposed on August 29, Randolph‘s and Morris‘, provide different ways of dealing with
the ambiguity of the Committee‘s proposed clause.
153 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448 (emphasis in original). The ―Union‖ being referred to, of
course, was the new federal union being created by the Constitution, and its ―nature‖ was the Federalist principles on which that document was being created. Joseph Story made a similar argument in explaining why, in his view, substantive deference obligations were mandated by the
constitutional Clause. Story based his explanation on the Founders‘ desire to ―form a more perfect Union; and to give to each state a higher security and confidence in the others . . . .‖ JOSEPH
STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1303 (1833) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Note that Madison avoids the debate over the Articles‘ meaning to
focus instead on what the obligation should be in the new federal union.
We have seen that one of Madison‘s main goals at the Convention was
to prevent states from interfering with one another‘s economic interests
and that he hoped to do this, in part, by making the federal government
a neutral arbiter between states, as part of a coordinated system for the
protection and enforcement of property and contract rights.154 This also
required the promotion of principles of administrative equality so that
states would assume, at least for some purposes, the status of ―mere
counties‖ in a larger federal union.155 Madison‘s proposal for interstate
execution of judgments is an application of these general principles to
the issue of state deference obligations for out-of-state judgments. It is a
radical proposal,156 and Madison does not suggest it as the constitutional
standard. Rather, he proposes it as a desirable policy goal that Congress
might be ―authorized‖ to require in appropriate circumstances. What
Madison was really proposing, therefore, was to authorize Congress to
increase the interstate deference obligation well beyond any such obligation that currently existed under the Articles‘ clause or the law of nations.157
It is doubtful Madison would have made such arguments if he did
not believe that the majority of delegates agreed with his normative
principle—that the new federal union coming into being justified, and
perhaps even required, greater levels of deference for out-of-state judgments.158 By focusing on what the rule should be, rather than what it
154 See discussion supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. As we have seen, Madison
shared the general distaste of many at the Convention for the actions of state legislatures and the
character of many of the men elected to them, which he saw as frequently trespassing on the
rights of minorities as well as the rights and interests of other states. See WOOD, THE CREATION,
supra note 16, at 476–83; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison) (defending the prohibition on ex post facto laws, bills of attainder and impairment of contracts).
155 See discussion supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
156 Yet it was not completely beyond the contemplation of contemporary judges construing the
full faith and credit obligation. In James v. Allen, counsel for defendant had argued that the Articles‘ clause ratcheted up the deference obligation created under the law of nations, ―if a Judgment . . . had not been evidence before, this provision . . . would have made it so—if it was only
prima facie evidence before, this would render it conclusive.‖ 1 Dall. 188, 190 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
1786). The judge rejects this argument, stating, ―[t]he Articles of Confederation . . . will not admit
of the construction contended for, otherwise executions might issue in one State upon the judgments given in another . . . .‖ Id. at 191–92. Since Judge Shippen believes the law of nations already requires substantive deference to foreign judgments in at least some cases, he is assuming
that the only higher level of deference for such judgments would be a rule of execution, an absurd
result under the Articles‘ clause.
157 It is surely not a coincidence that Gouveneur Morris, in that same discussion, proposed an
alternative draft to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which contained just such authorizing language. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448.
158 A connection of this sort is suggested by the argument of Jared Ingersoll in Phelps v. Holker. 1 Dall. 261, 261 (Pa. 1788). Ingersoll, a delegate to the Convention, see MANN, supra note 94,
at 184, represented the plaintiff in Phelps and argued for a substantive deference interpretation of
the Articles‘ clause shortly after the Convention had ended. He noted that
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was, Madison avoided arguments over the vague and ―extremely indeterminate‖ language of the Articles‘ clause.159 Yet rather than clarify the
precise parameters of the rule, Madison sought to use the vagueness to
justify a broad grant of power to the federal legislature to define and enforce a stronger deference obligation. We have seen that Madison was
willing to give the federal government power to curb improper or unwise state legislative action through a federal veto. 160 This proposal
created a more limited federal power to constrain states‘ refusals to enforce out-of-state judgments.
Moreover, giving power to Congress to define and expand the full
faith and credit obligation obviated any need to clarify or resolve the rarefied prima facie rule–substantive deference controversy in the Constitution itself. Madison had a number of good reasons not to clarify the
language in the constitutional text. First, clearly defining the constitutional language—even as a rule of substantive deference—would make
it harder, if not impossible, to later impose the execution rule that Madison really wanted.161 Second, Madison was always concerned that any
clear and limited statement of rights provided opportunities for evasion
by the unscrupulous (in this case, state legislatures).162 Moreover, in the
political debates regarding ratification of the Constitution, Madison
liked to argue (and may even have believed) that the Constitution did
not grant many new powers to the federal government, but merely provided for more effective use of the powers granted under the Articles.163
Retaining virtually identical language from the Articles‘ clause for the
first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause provided support for
such a position.164 Finally, the grant of power to Congress obviated any
[t]his then is a Union of which no precendent [sic] is to be found in any other part of
the globe . . . and its design must certainly have been to form a stronger cement, than
that by which the States themselves were hitherto connected, or by which they are, at
this day, connected with other nations. . . . [I]f it is admitted that by this article, the authors of the system intended to make a Judgment in New Jersey as binding in Pennsylvania, as if it had been obtained in any County of this State, no other form of words, or
mode of expression, could have been selected more clearly to convey that intention.
Phelps, 1 Dall. at 263. While admittedly an argument about the Articles‘ clause, it is easy to see
how Ingersoll‘s references to the ―stronger cement‖ now binding the states together and the analogy of states to counties reflect the broader federalist themes of the Convention and the belief that
they require rules of substantive deference.
159 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
160 See discussion supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text.
161 Indeed, that seems to have been one of the main purposes of Randolph‘s alternative proposal. See discussion infra Part II.B.
162 See, e.g., 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 440 (―Evasions might and would be devised [to the
Contract Clause] by the ingenuity of the Legislatures—‖); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 44
(James Madison) (discussing the problem of enumeration of the powers granted by the necessary
and proper clause).
163 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
164 BANNING, supra note 15, at 162 (―Madison repeatedly insisted that the Constitution should
be understood less as a grant of new authority than as a means of rendering effective the powers
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need to clarify the ―full faith and credit‖ language. If the courts construing that language interpreted it as mandating a rule of substantive
deference, that would be fine, but if not, the federal legislature would be
clearly empowered to enact such a rule as a matter of statute.165
The existence of a normative consensus among the drafters in favor of a rule of substantive deference is borne out by the response to
Madison‘s proposal by his Virginia colleague Edmund Randolph,
another experienced and highly esteemed attorney. 166 Randolph had no
problem with a rule of substantive deference, but was repelled by Madison‘s radical proposal for execution of sister state judgments, stating
that ―there was no instance of one nation executing judgments of the
Courts of another nation.‖167 Randolph then presented to the Convention
an alternative clause that laid out, in clear and precise detail, the full
faith obligations states would have toward one another. It provided for
both an evidentiary rule and a rule of substantive deference, making all
state acts, ―whether legislative executive or judiciary[,] . . . binding in
every other State, in all cases to which it may relate,‖168 with appropriate lawyerly caveats about jurisdiction and similar matters.169
that the central government had always had (at least on paper).‖). One can imagine Madison believing that the confused and indeterminate case law decided under the Articles‘ clause was simply another instance of states‘ failing to carry out the mandate of the Articles‘ which should have
given rise to a rule of substantive deference required by a coordinated union of states, and that the
constitutional Clause was simply a means of correcting that mistake. This is very close to the account Justice Story gives, in which the ―amendment in the Constitution‖ (which Story believed
mandated a rule of substantive deference) was, ―without question, designed to cure the defects in
the existing provision.‖ STORY, supra note 153, at § 1302.
165 Given Madison‘s concern over the capacities and political effectiveness of the courts, see
discussion infra Part III, it is likely he anticipated such a definitive rule might have to be set forth
by Congress.
166 George Washington appointed him the first Attorney General of the United States in 1789.
See USDOJ, EDMUND JENNINGS RANDOLPH, http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistpage.php?id=0
(last visited July 26, 2011).
167 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448.
168 Id. at 445. The full text of the proposal reads:
Whensoever the act of any State, whether legislative executive or judiciary shall be attested and exemplified under the seal thereof, such attestation and exemplification shall
be deemed in other State as full proof of the existence of that act—and it‘s operation
shall be binding in every other State, in all cases to which it may relate, and which are
within the cognizance and jurisdiction of the State, wherein the said act was done.
Id.
169 Legal scholars then (and now) recognize that any rule of substantive deference for judicial
or other state acts must be limited to circumstances where the state has valid power to act. See
Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); see also Laycock, supra note 3, at
298. The critical question is what determines such a finding of so-called ―judicial jurisdiction.‖
James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for
Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 177–78 (2004) [hereinafter Weinstein, Federal Common
Law]. On this point, Randolph‘s proposed amendment‘s conclusory reference to ―cognizance and
jurisdiction‖ might itself seem somewhat vague. Professor Weinstein, however, has argued that
by the time of the Founding, there was already a fairly clear conception of the territorial competence of courts under international law. See James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of Judicial Jurisdiction in 19th Century America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73, 83–84 (1990)
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Randolph‘s comment on Madison‘s proposal for sister-state execution of judgments suggests that Randolph‘s proposal was designed to be
a more conservative, less controversial one, more in keeping with the
law of nations.170 The substance of Randolph‘s proposal shows that it
was designed to clarify and delineate the obligations of states toward
one another in the new federal union, while preventing any drift or development toward further integration.171 It is surely indicative of the
general attitude of the Founders toward the full faith obligation that
even this conservative response to Madison‘s proposal contained a rule
of substantive deference.172
In short, a fair reading of the notes of the August 29 meeting reveals that the primary dispute was not between proponents of an evidentiary reading of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and proponents of a
rule of substantive deference. Rather, it was between proponents of a
precisely delineated, lawyerly coherent, and static clause that would
create and maintain a relatively clear set of obligations of deference between the states,173 and a looser, vaguer, less clearly defined statement
of those same obligations, whose content could be clarified and strengthened by subsequent acts of the national legislature.174
[hereinafter Weinstein, Dutch Influence]. Randolph‘s comments at the Convention on August 29,
1787, can be read as implying that his proposed language, unlike that of Morris, was limited to
what was in conformance to the law of nations. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 447.
170 See discussion infra notes 221–222 and accompanying text.
171 Most significantly, Randolph‘s proposal makes no provision for further elaboration of the
deference obligation through federal lawmaking. While the clause, to modern eyes, seems to contain significant ambiguity in its limitation of the ―binding‖ operation of an out-of-state act to ―all
cases to which it may relate, and which are within the cognizance and jurisdiction of the State,‖ 2
Farrand, supra note 1, at 448, it seems probable that Randolph believed the existing law of nations supplied the necessary jurisdictional rules. See Weinstein, Dutch Influence, supra note 169,
at 90 n.77. It also seems clear, based on his comments at the Convention, that Randolph, unlike
Madison, did not believe that the federal legislature could or should be empowered to create a
deference obligation greater than that required under the law of nations.
172 Although Whitten tries to argue even here that the rule is not as conclusive as it appears,
his argument here is much weaker and the word ―binding‖ is fairly dispositive. See Whitten,
FF&C and DOMA, supra note 3, at 289–92. Engdahl agrees that Randolph‘s proposal contained
a rule of substantive deference. See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1623.
173 The Extradition and Fugitive Slave Clauses, which were approved by the Convention on
August 28 and 29, 1787, the same session in which the Full Faith and Credit Clause was being
considered, also impose obligations on states to defer to determinations of sister states. 2 Farrand,
supra note 1, at 443, 453–54. Both were later incorporated into Article IV of the Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, 3. Indeed, they can be viewed as additional rules of substantive
deference, since in both instances one state‘s determination of a person‘s legal status, as a felon or
escaped slave, was made binding on all other states. In these clauses, however, there is no ambiguity regarding the states‘ obligations and no grant of federal power to define or enforce it. It
seems clear that in these instances, unlike the broader obligations of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the Founders wished to create precise and immutable rules of state conduct governing
specific circumstances (to their eternal discredit with regard to fugitive slaves).
174 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 445, 447–48. Randolph had rejected Madison‘s vision as impossible under the law of nations. For Madison, however, that was precisely the point. States
would no longer relate to each other as independent nations with separate judicial systems, but as
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That was the meaning and intent of the alternative proposal then
submitted to the Convention by Gouverneur Morris,175 which stated:
―[f]ull faith ought to be given in each State to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of every other State; and the Legislature shall
by general laws, determine the proof and effect of such acts, records,
and proceedings.‖176
Accordingly, the two new proposals by Randolph and Morris, both
probably drafted before the meeting on August 29, defined the poles of
the debate regarding the Full Faith and Credit Clause.177 It was not a debate between a prima facie rule and a rule of substantive deference. It
was a debate between static and dynamic conceptions of the full faith
obligation, but it was even more than that. It was a debate between two
styles of constitutional rulemaking, two ways to deal with broad, potentially ambiguous rules. One response, that of Randolph, was to define
and clarify the obligations being created as explicitly as possible. 178 The
other, that of Morris and Madison, was to provide an authority for resolving such ambiguities as they arose.
C.

Full Faith and Credit for Legislative Acts

The most striking change between the Articles‘ clause and the draft
proposed on August 6, 1787, was the extension of the full faith obligation to ―acts of the Legislatures.‖179 The reasons for this change are
parts of a coordinated federal union, whose state governments would relate to each other, if not as
―mere counties,‖ at least as subordinate parts of a larger federal union, which could prescribe
rules of deference to out-of-state actions which were in the interests of the nation as a whole. To
do this, one needed a looser, vaguer, less precise rule of substantive deference, with a grant of
power to the federal government to prescribe the precise form that deference would take as time
and circumstances warranted.
175 Id. at 448.
176 Id. (quotations omitted).
177 Id. at 445, 448.
178 Id. at 445. The advantages and disadvantages of stating legal norms as clear and precisely
defined ―rules‖ rather than vague but more flexible ―standards‖ has been extensively analyzed in
modern law reviews by commentators of many different political and methodological persuasions. See e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules and Social Norms, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 101 (1997); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV.
379 (1985). The assumption of this literature that the form in which a norm is stated may reflect
the underlying policy concerns of the drafter certainly seems to apply to the competing proposals
of Randolph and Morris/Madison.
179 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V; 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 188. It is
possible to read the Articles‘ clause as including statutes, if the term ―Acts‖ is read broadly to
include legislative acts and the phrase ―of the courts and magistrates‖ as modifying only ―judicial
proceedings.‖ Yet this view is ―questionable‖ at best. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1620. It is also
hard to reconcile such a reading with Wilson and Johnson‘s comment that the legislative acts
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even more obscure than usual because our primary source of information about such matters, Madison‘s notes, are not only sparse, but
somewhat ambiguous due to Madison‘s own redaction. Madison recorded Wilson and Johnson‘s explanation that ―acts of the Legislatures
should be included, [as they sometime serve the like purpose as act] for
the sake of Acts of insolvency &c—.‖180
Some scholars, noting that the line makes sense as written, ignore
the redaction and assume that the purposes of the inclusion of legislative
acts was primarily to insure deference to the relatively narrow class of
legislative actions that function like adjudications, particularly insolvency statutes.181 There are, however, significant problems with that assumption. First, Madison presumably deleted the phrase because he felt
it was incorrect or misleading in some way. While it seems clear that
state acts of insolvency were discussed (and Madison leaves the reference to such acts intact), he deletes the idea that they were included because they were viewed as similar in purpose to adjudication. At the
very least, this should cast doubt on any explanation of inclusion of legislative acts in the clause that relies too heavily on that analogy.
Moreover, the clause itself was not limited to acts of the legislature
that functioned like judgments, or acts relating to insolvency.182 Quite
the contrary, it initially extended to all ―Acts of the legislatures‖ and
was narrowed, in Morris‘ proposed draft of August 29, to ―public acts,‖
expressly excluding the private legislative acts most likely to function
like judgments.183 Finally, this discussion of full faith and credit in connection with acts of insolvency was immediately followed by a proposal
from Charles Pinckney to give the federal government power to ―establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies.‖184 It seems clear
that something led the delegates to perceive a substantial connection between the desirability of a federal bankruptcy power and the ―interstate
problems of full faith in the field of insolvency.‖ 185

were included in the constitutional Clause for the sake of acts of insolvency. See id. at 1622 n.181
180 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 447, 447 n.3. Bracketed words are crossed out, but legible, in
the original. Id.
181 Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 53–55. These acts functioned like court judgments because
they purported to discharge claims against particular individuals, much as a verdict for defendant
would. See argument of defendant in James v. Allen, discussed supra at note 68.
182 It appears that the use of legislative acts to provide insolvency relief was not a very widespread practice. Mann tells us that at the time of the Constitutional Convention, Connecticut was
the only state that ―granted insolvency relief by legislative act rather than judicial decree.‖ MANN,
supra note 94, at 183.
183 Crosskey argues that the exclusion of private acts from the operation of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the limitation of the bankruptcy power to ―uniform laws‖ shows that the Framers‘ reaction to these laws was strongly negative. CROSSKEY, supra note 144, at 544–45.
184 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 445.
185 Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 57.
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In short, we can infer that on or before August 29, 1787, there were
discussions186 concerning extending interstate deference to statutes and
acts of insolvency which (1) did not primarily rely on the argument that
insolvency acts served the same purpose as judgments; and (2) inclined
the Convention to support a federal power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws. It may also be noteworthy that such discussions would
have taken place contemporaneously with the Convention‘s consideration and tentative approval of a number of measures designed to prevent
state legislative interference with contract and property rights.187
It is likely that any such discussion involved some consideration of
the recently decided case of James v. Allen,188 and more generally of the
obligation under the law of nations to recognize, and in certain circumstances to apply, the statutes of foreign states. 189 It also helps explain
why the extension of the full faith obligation to statutes, which has puzzled many later scholars,190 might not have appeared as significant or as
surprising to lawyers at the time.191
In James,192 as previously noted,193 Judge Shippen recognized, in
dicta, an obligation by courts in some circumstances to recognize and
apply the legislative acts of foreign countries,194 particularly statutes re186 By ―discussion‖ I do not necessarily mean that all these issues were aired in unrecorded
debates before the Convention itself. It is possible that many of these ideas were discussed informally by groups of delegates off the floor or during recesses, leaving us with the somewhat cryptic account of just the formal actions taken.
187 The Convention had just approved an absolute prohibition on state laws providing for
payment of debts in anything but specie, seeing in the words of one of its sponsors ―a favorable
crisis for crushing paper money,‖ 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 439 (statement of Roger Sherman),
and also approved the Contract Clause, which Madison had somewhat ambivalently supported,
while commenting that, ―[e]vasions might and would be devised by the ingenuity of the [state]
Legislatures.‖ Id. at 440. The history of the Contract Clause is obscure, and Madison‘s initial
support for it was ambivalent. See John W. Ely, Jr., Origins and Development of the Contract
Clause 3–8 (Vanderbilt Pub. Law Research Paper No. 05–36, 2005), available at SSRN
http://ssrn.com/abstract=839904. Madison ―admitted that inconveniences might arise from such a
prohibition but thought on the whole it would be overbalanced by the utility of it.‖ 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 440. In Federalist 44, however, he describes laws impairing the obligation of contracts as ―contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound
legislation.‖ THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
188 See discussion supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
189 Not only was it the only reported case at that time involving both insolvency statutes and
full faith and credit obligations, but one of the lawyers who argued it, Jared Ingersoll, was a
member of the Pennsylvania delegation to the Convention along with James Wilson. See MANN,
supra note 94, at 184.
190 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1622–23; Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 73; Whitten,
State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 544.
191 Engdahl, for example, observes that extension of the full faith obligation to statutes was
such an ―unsettling‖ prospect, that Williamson‘s ―temperate response‖ is somewhat surprising.
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1622. Note: From context, the article‘s reference to ―Dr. Wilkinson‖
appears to be a typographical error, and that the author intended to refer to Dr. Williamson. Id.
192 James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188, 191 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786).
193 See discussion supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
194 Judge Shippen wrote,

YABLON.33-1.FINAL FOR PRINT.DOC

2011]

M A DI S O N ’ S F U L L F A I T H A N D C R E D I T

9/9/2011 6:08 PM

165

lating to contract rights.195 The reference to ―foreign countries‖ makes it
clear that Judge Shippen found the source of this obligation not under
the Articles‘ clause but pursuant to the law of nations. 196 There is general agreement among scholars that by the late eighteenth century, choice
of law rules were seen as part of the law of nations, which had been incorporated into English and thereafter American law. 197 Under the thenprevailing ―unilateralist‖ approach to conflict of laws, a single body of
doctrine derived primarily from concepts of international comity and
vested rights determined the law that would be applied to disputes with

And not only the decisions of Courts, but even the Laws of foreign countries, where no
suits have been instituted, would in some cases be taken notice of here; where such
laws are explanatory of the contracts, and appear to have been in the contemplation of
the parties at the time of making them; as if the interest of money should be higher in a
foreign country where the contract was made, than in that where the suit was brought,
the foreign interest shall be recovered, as being understood to be part of the contract.
1 Dall. at 191.
195 Mann explains the significance of statutory interest in the enforcement of debt instruments.
MANN, supra note 94, at 12. Critically, Judge Shippen is making these comments and applying
these doctrines under the Articles‘ clause, which contained no full faith obligation for legislative
acts. Accordingly the idea that foreign statutes should be given extraterritorial effect in appropriate cases was already an accepted concept in 1787, not an innovation of the Founders.
196 Although Judge Shippen cites no authority in support of his statements, he quite possibly
had in mind Lord Mansfield‘s statement in Robinson v. Bland, which stated: ―The general rule,
established ex comitate et jure gentium, is that the place where the contract is made, and not
where the action is brought, is to be considered in expounding and enforcing the contract.‖ (1790)
96 Eng. Rep. 129 (K.N.) 142 (quote not reported in case, see Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional
Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 808, 808 n.125 (1955)). Rheinstein notes that the
reported citations to the argument by the attorneys for the debtor in James v. Allen, make reference to ―those pages of Blackstone‘s and Burrow‘s Reports on which Robinson v. Bland is reported.‖ Rheinstein, supra at 808. A similar statement of the law can be found in John Marshall‘s
1788 explanation to the Virginia Constitutional Convention that suits in Virginia on contracts
made in Maryland must apply the interest specified by the law of Maryland, but he states this rule
as a ―principle in the jurisprudence of this commonwealth,‖ without mentioning the law of nations. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 556–57 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1831) [hereinafter 3 Elliot].
197 See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 594
(2003) (―Modern scholars agree that in the absence of statutory overrides, members of the founding generation expected the necessary choice-of-law rules to come from the general law of nations—a body of rules that (they believed) could be derived from the dictates of reason and from
common consent manifested by international custom.‖ (citations omitted)). This line of argument
was first developed by Max Rheinstein and William Crosskey, who argued that the constitutional
Full Faith and Credit Clause was meant to incorporate conflict of laws concepts that were perceived as part of the ius gentium (law of nations) at the time. CROSSKEY, supra note 144, at 550;
Rheinstein, supra note 196, at 808–12. While Crosskey argues that the first sentence of the constitutional Clause was intended to incorporate contemporary choice of law doctrine, CROSSKEY,
supra note 144, at 550, Rheinstein is a little more tentative, saying only that given the ―widely
held opinion‖ among lawyers that the law of nations determined these issues, it is ―no wonder‖
that the constitutional Clause was seen as creating obligations no greater than the law of nations.
Rheinstein, supra note 196, at 808–09. Whitten takes issue with these claims, arguing that it is
―textually unnatural,‖ and not a good fit with the ―preconstitutional context,‖ yet concedes that it
is a ―plausible reading.‖ Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 546 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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multistate aspects.198 Statutes providing for payment of interest could be
enforced extraterritorially since they formed part of the rights vested
under the contract created in that state.199 Significantly, in light of contemporary concerns, marriage was the other contractual relationship in
which the eighteenth-century law of nations clearly stated that the rights
of the parties were determined by the law of the place where the marriage took place.200
Although all scholars agree that the law of nations was part of
American law at the time of the Founding, 201 they disagree over the extent to which that law was incorporated into the full faith and credit
clauses of the Articles and of the Constitution. Indeed, the indeterminacy previously discussed concerning the Articles‘ clause can be seen as
198 According to historians of conflict of laws, the eighteenth century was the period when
English common law courts began to recognize an ius gentium or law of nations, which was conceived as part of English law, enforceable in its courts. The rules governing such choice of law
issues were derived from continental sources, primarily Ulrich Huber. Huber spoke of rights being acquired within a foreign territory, which rights were defined by the law of that place and
then given effect in a domestic tribunal. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER
L. REV. 419, 441 (1984); Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2
AM. J. COMP. L. 297, 306–08 (1953); see also Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum,
13 ILL. L. REV. 375, 376 (1918) (an English translation of Huber‘s De Conflictu Legum is provided in the article‘s appendix, id. at 401–18). This concept of vested rights not only underlay the
judge‘s comments in James v. Hall, but the general attitude of Madison and other framers toward
property rights as well. See discussion supra note 50 and accompanying text.
199 Madison clearly favored such rules as necessary for the preservation and effective enforcement of property rights. See discussion supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. Madison
envisioned a system whereby judgments obtained in one state could be swiftly executed in another. An even more fundamental requirement, however, was that debts incurred in one state be enforced, in accordance with their terms, in another. Yet as Judge Shippen noted, the failure of one
state‘s courts to give effect to the interest statutes in the state where the contract was made could
devalue that debt just as effectively as the use of paper money. See James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188,
191 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786). Moreover, a statute lowering or abolishing the interest to be paid on
foreign incurred debts is just the kind of ploy that might be attempted by ingenious state legislatures, unless blocked by a clear statement that such foreign statutes were subject to a full faith and
credit obligation.
200 See Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum, translated in 13 ILL. L. REV. 375, 401, 401–11
(Ernest G. Lorenzen trans., 1918); Rheinstein, supra note 196, at 807 n.124; Alexander N. Sack,
Conflicts of Law in the History of English Law, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835-1935
342, 441, 449 (1937).
201 This same concept of the law of nations was being used in American courts at the time of
the Founding to deny full faith and credit to judgments entered by foreign courts, which were
perceived as unable to create such vested rights. Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1786), discussed supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text, was the first American case that held
that judgments rendered without personal service on defendant within the state were not enforceable in other states. While the decision cites no authority, Weinstein has argued that the concept
that a court lacks power to adjudicate with regard to a defendant not found in its territory and that
such judgments should be denied extraterritorial effect is a concept that can be found in Huber,
and very likely known to judges in the post-revolutionary period. See Weinstein, Dutch Influence,
supra note 169, at 79–85; see also Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 860–61 (1978) (American concept of unwritten fundamental law founded on ―systematic treatises on the law of nature
and nations‖).
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uncertainty over precisely this issue.202 With regard to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, however, the record of the Convention debates strongly
suggests that the delegates viewed the deference obligations created by
the law of nations as at least a minimum statement of the interstate deference obligations created by the Clause, with the debate focusing on
how and to what extent those minimums should be exceeded.203 It is also very likely that Madison and his colleagues believed that certain basic principles of the law of nations constituted fundamental rules based
on ―rules of conduct which reason deduces,‖204 which could not be altered by statute.205
Insolvency statutes, however, were a relatively new type of legislation whose extraterritorial effects under the law of nations were far from
clear. In James, Judge Shippen avoided this issue206 by finding that the
202 Advocates of a purely evidentiary ―authentication‖ reading of the Clause believe it did not
incorporate any rules of the law of nations regarding the effects of foreign judgments (although
such rules might then be applied by courts to the authenticated judgments). See Sachs, supra note
1, at 1226; Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 546. Advocates of a prima facie
rule argued that the Clause embodies the preexisting English understanding of the law of nations
on the subject, see Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1597–99, and advocates of substantive deference
believed that the Clause required that the deference obligation among states to be something
greater than the law of nations.
203 Wilson and Johnson‘s statement that the Clause made out-of-state judgments ―grounds of
actions‖ reflects, at least, the prima facie rule Lord Mansfield derived from the law of nations.
Randolph‘s comment that Madison‘s proposed execution rule was ―unheard of‖ among nations
and his alternative proposal of a rule of substantive deference surrounded by jurisdictional restrictions indicates his view that the Clause should go to the outer limits of current understandings of
the law of nations, but no further. Wilson‘s comment that, without a Congressional right to declare the effect of sister state statutes the Clause will amount to no more than the rules currently
existing among independent nations indicates his view that interstate deference obligations under
the Clause should exceed those under the law of nations.
204 James Madison, An Examination of the British Doctrine Which Subjects to Capture a Neutral Trade Not Open in Time of Peace (1806), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 204, 238
(Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1908) (1787) (stating that the law of nations encompasses
―those rules of conduct which reason deduces, as consonant to justice and common good, from
the nature of the society existing among independent nations; with such definitions and modifications as may be established by general consent‖).
205 See Sherry, supra note 36, at 1137–38. Sherry shows that for lawyers of the Founders‘
generation, the law of nations, or at least its most fundamental principles, was a well established
part of a higher or more fundamental law with incorporated principles of the ―law of nature‖ and
―universal society‖ and which could be used to strike down validly enacted statutes which were
contrary to its principles. Id. at 1137–39. This is also consistent with Gordon Wood‘s observation
that there was a ―confusion‖ in the post-revolutionary period between indefeasible rights based on
the ―eternal laws of right reason‖ and ―written charters‖ as safeguards of those rights. WOOD,
THE CREATION, supra note 16, at 273–82. See generally Grey, supra note 200.
206 In James v. Allen, the defendant argued that his discharge under the New Jersey insolvency
act ―so far as regards the imprisonment or detention as his person‖ was, in effect, an adjudication
of the same debt sued on in Pennsylvania and should be applied to bar that suit. 1 Dall. 188, 189
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786). In making that case, lawyers for the defendant argued that proceedings
under the [New Jersey] Insolvent Act ―amount to a judicial decision; for, they determine a debt,
and give a remedy.‖ Id. Note the similarity to Madison‘s stricken statement regarding the ―like
purpose‖ of insolvency acts and adjudications. If this is the argument Madison was recollecting,
the strikethrough makes perfect sense, since it was an argument rejected explicitly in James v.
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New Jersey statute ―is a private act, made for that particular purpose; it
is local in its nature, and local in its terms.‖ 207 Delegates could reasonably anticipate, however, that additional cases would arise based on
broader insolvency acts that clearly purported to discharge out-of-state
debts.208 If the law of nations gave extraterritorial effect to a foreign statute creating contractual rights, what about a foreign statute extinguishing such rights?
Unlike the statutory debtor relief provisions Madison so adamantly
opposed, which enabled all debtors to discharge their debts for a fraction of their value, a well-drafted and -administered general bankruptcy
law would apply only to the more limited class of debtors who were actually insolvent and would ensure that all creditors were treated equitably. In the latter half of the eighteenth century the popular conception of
debt was changing from a moral failing to an economic one.209 Discharge of debts through bankruptcy was increasingly seen as a relatively
efficient and effective alternative to debtors‘ prison.210 Madison‘s views
were certainly in line with this new thinking. His concerns were always
with the economic effects of paper tender laws and other impairments of
contract. Bankruptcy laws, he recognized, could be an important part of
the regulation of commerce, benefiting creditors as well as debtors.211
Although these were important considerations inclining the drafters to
include bankruptcy statutes in the full faith obligation, probably the
most important consideration was the economic harm likely to ensue if
states could exclude their creditors from the operation of other state‘s
bankruptcy laws.
What emerged from the Convention on this question may be seen
as a tentative and limited endorsement of the state legislatures‘ powers
to safeguard its debtors through bankruptcy laws. The full faith obligation would be extended to all ―public acts‖ of the state legislatures, implicitly endorsing the holding of James and discouraging other private
laws meant to benefit specific individuals. While the law of nations
might provide some guidance as to when bankruptcy discharges pursuant to these statutes are to be given extraterritorial effect, the federal
government was empowered to act as a neutral arbiter to prescribe the
extraterritorial effects of such statutes. And, if the whole structure
Allen and implicitly by the Full Faith and Credit Clause limitation to ―public acts.‖
207 Id. at 191.
208 It is likely many delegates knew of the pending case of Millar v. Hall, 1 Dall. 229 (Pa.
1788), which Jared Ingersoll was then preparing to argue. MANN, supra note 94, at 184. That case
involved the extra-territorial effect of a discharge under the Maryland insolvency act, which the
court later described as a ―general bankrupt law‖ which purported to discharge all claims against
the debtor.
209 See generally id.
210 See, e.g., Millar, 1 Dall. at 231.
211 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
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proved too unwieldy or corrupt, the federal government had the power
to supplant the whole thing with uniform federal laws.
D.

Mandatory and Discretionary Power Under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause

When the Committee on Detail issued its revised version of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause on September 1, 1787, it accepted the basic
framework of the Madison-Morris proposal of the week before.212 The
first sentence contained a broad, vague obligation on each state to give
―full faith and credit‖ to ―public acts, records and judicial proceedings‖
of the other states.213 The second sentence gave the federal government
power to prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings could be proved, but significantly limited the federal government‘s
power to prescribe the effects of one state‘s actions in another state to
―judgments,‖ thereby depriving the federal government of the power to
prescribe the effects of state legislative acts in other states. 214 This modification of Morris‘s original proposal appears to have been intended as
a compromise to appease Randolph, whose alternative, clearer, and
more narrowly drafted proposal—which granted no express powers to
the federal government215—the Committee had implicitly rejected.
This conflict became clear when the issue was debated on September 3. Morris moved to amend the language to reinstate his original proposal and give Congress power to prescribe the effects of legislative
acts as well as judgments. James Wilson supported the amendment, stating that ―if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the
provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place
among all Independent Nations.‖216
212
213
214
215
216

2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 483–84.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 445, 448.
Id. at 488. Wilson‘s comment is significant in a number of respects. It assumes, like Judge
Shippen in James v. Allen, 1 Dall. 188, 191 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1786), that even independent nations have some obligation, under appropriate circumstances, to apply the legislative acts of other
states to issues before them. Such obligations, however, were not seen as an infringement on sovereignty because the states themselves applied the principles of ―comity‖ and vested rights that
gave rise to such obligations. Again, the critical theoretical justification for the extra-territorial
application of foreign law was Huber, who in his dissertation, De conflictu legum diversarum in
diversis imperiis, sought to derive a conflicts system ―directly from the notions of sovereignty
and comity.‖ Juenger, supra note 198, at 434–35; see also Huber, supra note 200, at 401–18. Giving a different sovereign, i.e., the federal government, power to prescribe the effects of one state‘s
laws in the proceedings of another state, however, was very much a potential infringement on
state sovereignty and independent decision-making. It gave the federal government power to
modify the prevailing conflict rules then seen as part of the law of nations in favor of stricter deference obligations unique to the states of a federal union.
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For Wilson, that was exactly the point. His comment assumes that
the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause should impose on the
states an obligation of interstate deference greater than that which then
existed ―among all independent nations.‖217 A major goal of the drafters
of the new Constitution, as we have seen, was to limit state power to
take actions deleterious to the sister states and the property interests of
citizens of those states.218 Having just restricted the rights of states to
issue paper money and impair contract rights, it must surely have
seemed appropriate to Wilson, Madison and others to further restrict a
state‘s power to deny effect of sister-state laws in appropriate cases.
The only way to ensure that such laws would be fairly and uniformly enforced, on this view, was to give the federal government
power to prescribe and police the rules regarding such interstate deference. While this is an additional grant of power to the federal government, it is important to note that it is designed to achieve a particular
substantive goal, a coordinated economic union, in which rights created
in one state would be fairly and effectively enforced in all the others.219
The allocation of power in the second sentence of the Clause was justi-

217 CROSSKEY, supra note 144, at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted). Crosskey makes a
curious argument here, tying Wilson‘s comment to a supposed ―weakened‖ clause resulting from
the substitution of ―ought ― for ―shall‖ in the first sentence. This supposedly created a drafting
dilemma for the Convention that ―was anxious to make as certain as possible that the states were
bound, whilst, at the same time, they made absolutely certain that plenary legislative power in the
premises would belong to Congress.‖ Id. Crosskey argues that their first solution to this problem
was the bizarre ―mandatory direction to Congress to legislate comprehensively,‖ which was later
solved by Madison‘s more effective reversal of the mandatory and permissive tone of the two
sentences of the clause. Id. at 552–53 (emphasis omitted); see also discussion supra note 197 and
accompanying text. This argument seems to me to be fundamentally misguided. First, the debate
at this point seems totally focused on extending congressional power to legislative acts, not the
distinction between hortatory and mandatory. Indeed, Wilson‘s comment speaks of ―allowing‖
the legislature to declare the effects of legislative acts, not mandating that they do so, which is
what the language at that point actually seemed to require. Moreover, if Crosskey is right, Madison‘s changes actually altered the meaning of the clause significantly. Under Madison‘s language,
states are required to give full faith and credit to other states legislative acts, even when Congress
has not acted (presumably according to the law of nations). Under the committee‘s version, they
were merely being urged to do so. I think it doubtful such a major change would have been
adopted without discussion and by a unanimous vote. Finally, Crosskey‘s claim that the Convention was concerned about insuring that Congress had ―plenary legislative power‖ through constitutional drafting seems inconsistent with the general assumption of Madison and others of legislative supremacy. See discussion infra notes 253–55 and accompanying text. For reasons stated
more fully below, I believe the awkward language in the Committee‘s draft represents a certain
clumsiness in drafting rather than any substantive effort to alter the mandatory nature of the
states‘ obligation or the plenary power of Congress.
218 See Robertson, supra note 24, at 201–03; discussion supra notes 47–55 and accompanying
text.
219 The implication of Wilson‘s comment, after all, is that given this power, the federal legislature is likely to impose deference obligations on the states greater than those then existing
―among all Independent Nations.‖
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fied as the best way of achieving the substantive goal of the first sentence.220
Edmund Randolph‘s statement in opposition to Morris‘s proposed
amendment shows that he understood both his opponents‘ arguments
and their strategy. Madison‘s notes state:
Mr. Randolph considered it as strengthening the general objection
agst. the plan, that its definition of the powers of the Government
was so loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers. He was for not going farther than the Report, which enables the
Legislature to provide for the effect of Judgments.221

Unlike Madison, Randolph‘s objection is based solely on the perceived infringement on state sovereignty, regardless of any beneficial
results that might be achieved by such a redistribution of powers. He also recognizes that this aggrandizement of federal power has been
achieved by his opponents through a ―loose‖ definition of powers, like
those in the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which
could then be interpreted in expansive ways by subsequent federal legislation and imposed on the states under the Supremacy Clause.222 Madison and his allies, however, saw things differently. They did favor a
broad allocation of federal power to define and enforce the vague ―full
220 In Madison‘s notes, Wilson‘s statement is preceded by a curious comment from George
Mason that he ―favored the motion [presumably, Morris‘ motion to amend], particularly if the
‗effect‘ was to be restrained to judgments & Judicial proceedings.‖ 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at
488. Since Morris‘ motion was for the exact opposite purpose, to extend the Federal government‘s power to declare the effect of legislative acts as well as judgments, prior commentators
have assumed that Madison‘s notes were simply mistaken, or at least that Mason‘s comment was
made at a different time in the debates. See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1625 n.192. There is another
way to understand Mason‘s comment, under which it makes sense in its actual placement. Mason
might have supported extending the power of the federal government to prescribe the effect of
out-of-state legislation, but only when the effect of such legislation was an issue in ―judgments
and judicial proceedings‖ sought to be enforced in another state. This would give the federal government power to prescribe rules for adjudicating cases involving contract or property rights
created in other states, but would deny it a general power to make the laws of one state binding in
the territory of another. This is somewhat consistent with the comment of Johnson immediately
following Wilson‘s statement, that he ―thought the amendment as worded would authorize the
Genl. Legislature to declare the effect of Legislative acts of one State, in another State.‖ 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 488. Such an interpretation is also consistent with a major theme of this
section, that there was general agreement among the framers to create a substantive obligation
among the states to enforce each others‘ contractual and property rights fairly and consistently,
but that there was substantial disagreement over how much power the federal government should
be given to define and expand that obligation.
221 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 488–89 (emphasis in original).
222 Randolph expanded on these concerns in his letter of October 10, 1787, to the Virginia
state legislature, where he cited them as one of his primary reasons for seeking greater ease in
amending the Constitution. 3 Farrand, supra note 135, at 123–27. As he stated, ―I also fear more
from inaccuracies in a constitution, than from gross errors in any other composition; because our
dearest interests are to be regulated by it; and power, if loosely given, especially where it will be
interpreted with great latitude, may bring sorrow in its execution.‖ Id. at 126. These concerns
about potential misuse of unchecked federal power ultimately led both Randolph and Mason to
refuse to sign the Constitution. See BANNING, supra note 15, at 253.
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faith and credit‖ obligation, but they saw this as the best means of protecting and enforcing rights created under sister-state law. The broad,
vague mandate was necessary not to aggrandize federal power as an end
in itself, but because of the myriad ways states might avoid or delay
their obligations to enforce such rights. It was Madison‘s ―federal negative,‖ but limited to negating state interference with enforcement of other states‘ vested rights. The vote was a disputed one, but Morris‘s
amendment was adopted, six states to three.223
At that point, Madison proposed two additional changes in the language of the Clause.224 He suggested that the word ―ought‖ in the first
sentence be changed to ―shall,‖ and ―shall‖ in the second sentence
changed to ―may.‖225 These changes were adopted by the Convention
―nem.con,‖226 i.e., unanimously.227 Some scholars have argued that
these last minute changes resulted in a significant alteration in the
meaning of the Clause, either by creating a mandatory obligation on
states through the first sentence228 or by giving discretionary power to
the federal legislature in the second.229
Such contentions seem at odds with the dynamics of the proceedings as set forth in the records of the Convention. The Committee had
just gotten through a fairly acrimonious debate over whether to extend
power to declare the effects of public acts to the federal legislature, a
proposal that was passed in a sharply divided vote involving significant
concerns about infringements on state sovereignty.230 Why would the
Convention then accept unanimously an alternative version of the
Clause that either significantly increased the obligation of states or significantly altered the power granted to the federal legislature?
The most obvious answer is that Madison‘s proposed wording
changes were not designed to do anything of the sort. They simply improved the language and slightly clarified the meaning of the provision
that had already been voted on and passed. With respect to the change
in the first sentence, this is fairly obvious. The word ―shall‖ had defined
the states‘ full faith obligation in the Articles and in the initial Commit223
224
225
226
227

2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 489.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See 10 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 313 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1989).
228 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 292 (importance of change from precatory to mandatory language in first sentence); Nadelmann, supra note 3, at 71 (importance of ―shall‖ in the first sentence of the Clause); see also Crosskey‘s argument discussed supra note 217.
229 Most recently, Professor Engdahl has argued that the addition of ―may‖ in the second sentence of the clause, was designed to mollify Randolph, and that this converted the second sentence from an obligation to declare the effect of sister state judgments to a discretionary plenary
power. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1627.
230 See discussion supra notes 209–218 and accompanying text.
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tee draft of the constitutional Clause.231 ―Ought‖ had crept in as part of
Gouverneur Morris‘s proposed amendment.232 Yet the prior debate had
just made it clear that full faith and credit was to be a somewhat vague
yet mandatory obligation on the states, an obligation that would be defined and enforced by federal legislation binding on the states under the
Supremacy Clause.233 Madison‘s reinstatement of ―shall‖ in the first
sentence of the clause simply made it more accurate and removed a
small potential ambiguity.
With respect to the second sentence, the substitution of ―may‖ for
―shall‖ was a reflection of political reality as Madison and others saw it.
The Congress they were creating was to be the supreme lawmaking
body of the nation, and such bodies, by their nature, must have plenary,
discretionary power, at least with respect to legislative acts. Who, after
all, could possibly enforce a requirement that Congress ―shall‖ prescribe
the effects of sister-state judgments if Congress chose not to do so?234
Once Congress was given the power to prescribe effects, decisions as to
how to exercise that power had to rest with it. ―May‖ was simply a more
accurate reflection of the realities of the grant of federal power than
―shall.‖235 Moreover, as we have seen, Madison and others assumed that
a federal legislature would have the appropriate incentives and perspectives to promote fair and consistent enforcement of the rights of out-ofstate litigants.236 With the acceptance of Madison‘s changes, the constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause was essentially complete.237
As the Constitutional Convention came to a close, Madison‘s feelings about the work of the Convention were surprisingly negative. In a
short letter to Thomas Jefferson dated September 6, 1787, Madison expressed his opinion that ―the plan [i.e., the proposed Constitution],
should it be adopted, will neither effectually answer its national object,
231
232

See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV; 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 489.
2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 489. While ―ought‖ can be used to describe a somewhat weaker
form of obligation than ―shall,‖ it can also describe the same level of obligation with a more normative implication. (Consider a parent‘s statement, ―you ought to stop playing video games and
start doing your homework right now.‖). It is likely Morris had this increased normative obligation in mind when he changed ―shall‖ to ―ought.‖
233 Id. at 488.
234 The relatively few mandatory provisions in the Constitution involving Congress, mostly in
Article I, Section 9, all involve prohibitions on congressional action as does most of the Bill of
Rights, which Madison famously first opposed. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, amends. I–X. Such
prohibitions might possibly be enforced through presidential veto and/or judicial action, although
most likely, as we shall see, through legislative restraint. Creating an affirmative constitutional
obligation on Congress to pass a particular type of law, however, would have appeared both unworkable and incoherent.
235 It is also likely that Morris, in stating that Congress ―shall by general laws‖ prescribe the
rules for proof and effect of sister state laws and judgments, did not intend to impose any such
mandate on Congress, but simply to exclude their power to act by anything other than general
laws, that is, by private legislation.
236 See discussion supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
237 The only subsequent change was the substitution of the word ―Congress‖ for legislature.
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not prevent the local mischiefs which everywhere excite disgusts agst.
the State Governments.‖238
With respect to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, Madison never expressed anything but satisfaction and unqualified approval.
He praised the ―effects clause‖ in Federalist No. 42 as a ―marked improvement‖ over the Articles‘ clause.239 In the debates on the Constitution before the Virginia Legislature, Madison‘s approval was even more
emphatic. In response to a question from George Mason raising again
the propriety of a clause that granted Congress power to declare the effect of one state‘s acts in another state, Madison replied that in his opinion, ―this is a clause which is absolutely necessary. I have never heard
any objection to this clause before, and have not employed a thought on
the subject.‖240
Madison appears never to have perceived any potential conflict between the first and second sentences of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and certainly makes no mention of it at this time or in his later writings.
Why this should be so is the topic of the third and final part.
III. MADISON, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND THE NATURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
A.

The Ahistorical Question

This Article began by pointing out the inconsistency between the
first and second sentences of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. It is an
238 3 Farrand, supra note 135, at 77. A month later, he expanded on those concerns in a longer
letter to Jefferson, which bemoaned the absence of a ―federal negative‖ in the proposed Constitution and expressed pessimism that the judiciary could effectively enforce the various constitutional prohibitions on state legislative misconduct that had been included or the separation of federal
and state powers set forth in that document. Madison stated:
It may be said that the Judicial authority, under our new system will keep the States
within their proper limits, and supply the place of a negative on their laws. The answer
is, that it is more convenient to prevent the passage of a law than to declare it void after
it is passed; that this will be particularly the case, where the law aggrieves individuals,
who may be unable to support an appeal agst. a State to the supreme Judiciary; that a
State which would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very ready
to obey a Judicial decree in support of them, and that a recurrence to force, which, in
the event of disobedience would be necessary, is an evil which the new Constitution
meant to exclude as far as possible.
Id. at 134 (Letter to Thomas Jefferson dated October 24, 1787).
239 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
240 3 Elliot, supra note 196, at 584–85. It is true that Madison‘s support for the Full Faith and
Credit Clause was expressed in public debate, while his misgivings about the Constitution as a
whole were expressed privately in letters to friends. Nonetheless, it is significant that even in public debate, Madison appeared to believe that the Clause was a relatively uncontroversial part of
the Constitution that needed little polemical support. In his private letters regarding the Constitution, he appears never to have found the Clause worth mentioning at all.
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inconsistency that is readily apparent to all modern legal scholars, and
most recent work on the Clause has been, at least in significant part, attempts to explain and resolve that inconsistency. 241 The currently prevailing view of the Clause‘s history (which this Article has largely rejected) is that the first sentence originally embodied a relatively modest
evidentiary rule, requiring states only to recognize judgments of other
states as official acts of those states, and to treat them as prima facie
evidence of the underlying claim.242 Even this reading does not remove
the inconsistency between the first and second sentences of the Clause,
however, since the plenary power granted in the second sentence would
appear to give Congress power to authorize states to abrogate even a
prima facie rule.
All such attempts to provide a correct historical understanding of
the inconsistency in the Full Faith and Credit Clause are unsatisfactory
because they are adopting an ahistorical perspective on the problem.
They (and we, in the introduction to this Article) are seeking to provide
a ―legal‖ interpretation of the Clause, that is, the kind of interpretation a
judge would arrive at if asked to determine the appropriate limits of the
powers granted to Congress under the Clause. Interpreting the Clause in
this ―legal‖ way means adopting the perspective of a judge, a neutral,
retrospective reviewer of congressional action, with the right to make
the ultimate decision as to whether constitutional limits have been exceeded. We adopt such a perspective easily because we have been
trained to view the Constitution primarily as a legal document, to be
analyzed by methods similar to those utilized by the U.S. Supreme
Court in its legal opinions. In this sense, the concept and practice of
judicial review is critical to our modern understanding of the Constitution.
In recent years, there has been much important historical work
done on the origins of the concept of judicial review. 243 That work has
shed new light on the difference between the way the Constitution was
perceived at the time of the Founding and in later periods. In The
People Themselves, Larry Kramer has argued that the ―modern under241 Commentators like Laycock and Tribe privilege the first sentence of the clause and believe
it imposes significant constitutional limits on Congressional action. See 142 CONG. REC. S5932
(daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (reprinting Letter from Laurence Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., and Ralph S. Taylor, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Edward M.
Kennedy, U.S. Senator (May 24, 1996)); Laycock, supra note 3, at 297-305. Crane, in contrast,
privileges the second sentence, reducing the first sentence to a default rule. Crane, supra note 3,
at 323–34. Engdahl, Sachs and Whitten, by providing a narrower reading of the first sentence of
the Clause, reduce its importance, but do not entirely remove the tension between the first and
second sentences of the Clause. See discussion supra notes 3–7.
242 See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1655; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1206; Whitten, FF&C and
DOMA, supra note 3, at 257.
243 See, e.g., KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29; Rakove, Origins, supra note 29, at 1031;
William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 457 (2005).
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standing‖ of the Constitution as ―a species of law‖ is ―of surprisingly
recent vintage.‖244 Kramer states that ―[b]oth in its origins and for most
of our history . . . [f]inal interpretive authority rested with ‗the people
themselves,‘ and courts no less than elected representatives were subordinate to their judgments.‖245 Jack Rakove and others have shown that
while a concept of judicial review derived from the Supremacy Clause
was a part of the original constitutional scheme (enacted in part as a
more limited alternative to Madison‘s ―federal negative‖), that concept
of judicial review was effectively limited to policing state legislation
that encroached on federal prerogatives, and was not expected to act as
a constraint on federal legislative power.246
From this perspective, we can see that the question how Madison
would have resolved the potential inconsistency between the first and
second sentences of the Full Faith and Credit Clause (or even why he
did not recognize it) are both ahistorical questions. The questions themselves presuppose a ―legal‖ reading of the Constitution as a set of fundamental laws that constrain the actions of all branches of government.
For Madison, the salient question was not whether the Constitution, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, should constrain Congress‘ exercise
of power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (a possibility he viewed
as both improper and unlikely), but whether Congress itself would act
properly and constitutionally in exercising its powers under that and
other clauses of the Constitution.
244 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 7–8; see also SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1990) (early understanding of the Constitution
as ―a political instrument different in kind from ordinary law‖).
245 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 8.
246 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (noting that ―in controversies relating to the
boundary between the two jurisdictions [state and federal], the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government‖); see also Rakove, Origins, supra note
29, at 1047. Rakove argues that ―[u]ndisputably, judicial review, conceived as a mechanism of
federalism, was palpably and unequivocally a fundamental element of the original intention of the
Constitution with the Supremacy Clause as its trumpet.‖ Id. Rakove goes on to show that ―this
was the dimension of judicial review that originally mattered most—as opposed to the rival (and
theoretically more interesting) claim of judicial supremacy in the form of final review of national
legislation.‖ Id. Gordon Wood similarly argued that Madison never viewed constitutional questions as ordinary law whose final adjudication was ultimately left to courts. Rather, ―[b]oth Jefferson and Madison remained convinced to the end of their lives that all parts of America‘s governments had equal authority to interpret the fundamental law of the Constitution . . . .‖ Wood,
Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 796. Similarly, Sylvia Snowiss has argued that in the
earliest periods of the republic, ―judicial enforcement of the Constitution was an extraordinary
political act, a judicial substitute for revolution‖ and was limited to the ―concededly unconstitutional act.‖ SNOWISS, supra note 244, at 3, 34–44. More recently, Dean Treanor, in an exhaustive
study of judicial review cases prior to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), found
that cases enforcing such federalism constraints in this period invariably struck down state rather
than federal legislation. Treanor, supra note 243, at 457; see also Jenna Bednar, The Madisonian
Scheme to Control the National Government, in JAMES MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 217, 223–24 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2003) (describing Madison‘s
objections to judicial review).
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For Madison in 1787, there was only a small and somewhat theoretical distinction between unwise or improper actions by Congress and
unconstitutional ones. The Constitution was intended to influence and
constrain the federal legislature, giving them an additional reason to do
what Madison hoped their national perspective and concern for political
virtue would already incline them to do: abjure ―faction‖ and pass laws
in the national interest. We do not see Madison worrying about the precise limits of congressional constitutional powers because these concerns are part of his broader worry (which we see manifested often) that
the entire plan for a federal union may fail.247
Nonetheless, Madison‘s statements also show that he hoped and
expected that the Constitution would constrain congressional action to
some degree, even if the constraints were only internal appeals to right
action. It is also clear that Madison viewed the grant of power to Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause as designed to achieve a
particular result: to promote ―harmony and proper intercourse‖ among
the states.248
With this in mind, it is possible to refashion the question regarding
Madison‘s original understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
into a historically coherent one, by asking to what extent did Madison
expect and hope that the Clause (or other binding constraints presupposed by the Clause, such as the law of nations249) would constrain the
exercise of power granted to Congress under the Clause. On this point,
the historical evidence points strongly to the conclusion that Madison
did not believe that the power to be exercised by Congress would be unconstrained. Rather, it would be limited by the law of nations, by the
―indeterminate‖ (but far from meaningless) first sentence of the Clause,
which at least mandated the deference required by the law of nations,
and quite possibly even more substantive levels of deference, and finally, by the ―nature of the Union‖ itself,250 which could justify lawmaking
that strengthened the federal union and promoted harmony among states
well beyond any that had previously existed under the Articles of Confederation.251 In short, the Clause fit perfectly with Madison‘s broader
constitutional plan. Congress would be acting both properly and constitutionally when it enacted laws which promoted deference and harmony
among the states, but would be acting both improperly and unconstitutionally if it passed laws that permitted states to ignore or abrogate
judgments or laws of sister states.
247 See Madison, Letter to Jefferson, supra note 119, at 326; see also 3 Farrand, supra note
135, at 85 (Benjamin Franklin‘s comment, ―[a] republic . . . if you can keep it.‖).
248 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
249 See Sherry, supra note 36, at 1137–39.
250 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448.
251 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
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Accordingly, the power granted to Congress in the second sentence
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is ―plenary‖ only in the very limited
sense that Madison believed that no other political institution (including
the Supreme Court) could or should constrain congressional lawmaking
powers. But Madison believed and hoped that powerful legal, moral,
political, and constitutional constraints were being created by the new
plan of government that would prevent Congress from making laws that
violated the mandate of the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
The following two sections provide the historical bases for these
conclusions, focusing first on Madison‘s views on the institutional or
external constraints of Congressional action and then on the internal
constraints on such actions.
B.

Constitutional Interpretative Authority and Institutional
Constraints on Congressional Lawmaking Power

To understand the Full Faith and Credit Clause as Madison understood it, we must jettison the idea that the Constitution is primarily a
species of law, subject to comprehensive judicial interpretation, and
view it rather, as Madison did, as a ―plan‖ for a new government.252
Understanding the ―plan‖ of the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires
resolving two rather different issues, one involving federalism and the
other separation of powers. The federalism question was whether states
or the federal government would have the power to define, specify, and
enforce the requirement of interstate deference set forth in the Clause.
The second sentence of the Clause definitively resolved that issue by
expressly giving power to the federal legislature to ―prescribe‖ the ―effects‖ of state judgments and legislative acts in other states. We have
seen that this was a somewhat controversial position, won only after
substantial debate, yet one that Madison believed made the Clause an
―evident and valuable improvement‖ over its predecessor.253
Yet the reason for that anticipated improvement was that Madison
hoped and expected the federal legislature to effectively enforce and
strengthen the requirements of interstate deference set forth in the first
section of the Clause.254 He expected them to act that way in accordance
252 In the period after the Constitutional Convention, Madison frequently used the term ―plan‖
to refer to the proposed Constitution in both his public and private writings. See, e.g., 3 Farrand,
supra note 135, at 98 (Madison‘s letter to Edmund Pendleton dated Sept. 20, 1787); id. at 135–36
(Madison‘s letter to Thomas Jefferson dated Oct. 24, 1787); id. at 361 (Madison‘s statement in
House of Representatives dated Apr. 22, 1790); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
253 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
254 See id. It should be noted that the one ―improvement‖ Madison envisions in Federalist
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with his elaborate theory of the federal government acting in the national interest and as a neutral arbiter among states. He certainly hoped they
would act that way, but did he think they were constitutionally required
to act that way? This raises the second, separation of powers question:
Does the Constitution itself, particularly the first sentence of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, impose any limits on federal lawmaking power
regarding interstate deference?
This question, which looms so large today, would have appeared to
Madison to be so abstract and impractical as to be almost unanswerable.
The important institutional fact for Madison was that Congress had both
the political power and normative right to determine the propriety and
the constitutionality of their actions without any second-guessing by the
Supreme Court. Asking whether they were constrained by the Constitution, therefore, was a little like asking the same question today regarding the Justices of the Supreme Court.255
As Rakove notes, ―[f]or Madison in the 1780s, the political superiority of the legislature—and especially the lower house—was the dominant fact of republican government, and all calculations about the capacities of other institutions were the dependent variables of this
fact.‖256
42—more effective enforcement of claims against those who have ―suddenly and secretly translated‖ their property (―effects liable to justice‖) across the ―borders of contiguous states‖—
involves greater harmony and coordination between the legal systems of different states. Id.
Whether this will be the result of a law requiring enforcement of the judgments of one state in
those of others or some less drastic Congressional action is unclear. What is clear is that Madison
saw the grant of power to Congress in the second sentence of the Clause, not as an improvement
in itself, but as a means of improving harmony and coordination among state legal systems.
255 In this regard, it is worth considering whether we would describe the Supreme Court‘s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as ―unconstitutional.‖ On the one hand, we
now recognize the Supreme Court‘s plenary power, as an unreviewable decision-maker, to make
whatever decision it wants with respect to a case that falls within its jurisdiction. Yet we also believe that the Supreme Court is normatively obligated to follow the Constitution, and, I assume,
most of us hold a view of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, even as it was understood at the time Plessy was decided, which would lead us to conclude that, we, if we had been on
the Supreme Court, we would have felt constitutionally obligated to rule the other way. We might
try to square the circle by saying something like ―Plessy v. Ferguson is inconsistent with the
proper understanding of the constitutional norms embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.‖
I submit that Madison might well have answered a question about congressional passage of
a law abolishing existing obligations of sister state deference in much the same way. He would
have recognized that under the second sentence of the Clause, Congress had power, ―jurisdiction‖
one might say, to make such a law, but would also assert Congress‘ normative obligation to pass
laws consistent with the first sentence of the Clause. See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at
137 (discussion of the Revolution of 1800); discussion supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
256 Jack N. Rakove, Judicial Power in the Constitutional Theory of James Madison, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1513, 1531 (2002) [hereinafter Rakove, Judicial Power]. In his analysis of Madison‘s political thought at the time, Rakove shows that Madison was deeply pessimistic that the
judiciary could act as an effective means of curbing state legislative abuses. See John Ferejohn,
Madisonian Separation of Powers, in JAMES MADISON: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 126, 132 (Samuel Kernell ed., 2003) (―[Madison] regarded the legislative power as difficult or impossible to place under external limitations.‖). Rakove shows that as
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Madison anticipated that the new government would have radically
different methods for resolving questions regarding the constitutionality
of state laws and those enacted by the federal government. While Madison had pragmatic and political doubts about the judiciary being able to
fulfill its constitutionally anticipated role in enforcing federal superiority against contrary state laws, there is no doubt they had been given that
role.257 With respect to determinations of the constitutionality of federal
laws, however, where the judiciary had no specified constitutional role,
258 Madison had principled as well as pragmatic concerns about the judiciary taking for itself the role of final arbiter of the constitutionality of
actions by coordinate branches of the federal government.
Recent scholarship has shown that in its inception, and for many
years thereafter, the ―American doctrine of judicial review was far more
concerned with federalism than with separation of powers,‖ and that
early as 1785, Madison‘s writings imply that ―fundamental violations of a constitutional scheme
would not be amenable to judicial correction in the ordinary course of things‖ and that ―the judiciary had no special duty or capacity to maintain constitutional norms.‖ Rakove, Judicial Power,
supra note 256, at 1518.
Madison‘s work in drafting the Constitution did not improve his view concerning the effectiveness of the judicial branch. He continued to believe it was a mistake to reject his idea of a Congressional ―negative‖ on state legislation and to leave it to the judiciary, acting through the Supremacy Clause, to police the boundary between constitutional and unconstitutional state
legislative acts. His concerns were two-fold. See 3 Farrand, supra note 135, at 133–34 (Madison‘s
letter to Thomas Jefferson dated October 24, 1787). First, the very nature of judicial process
meant that challenges to state legislation could only arise in an uncertain, haphazard, and belated
manner, when an aggrieved but well funded individual chose to pursue a judicial remedy through
the appellate process. Id. at 134. He doubted that the mere possibility of such ex post challenges
would exert much restraint on state legislatures. Id.
An even greater problem, however, was that the judicial branch had no political means of
enforcing its rulings on the states. As Madison noted,
[A] State which would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very
ready to obey a judicial decree in support of them, and that a recurrence to force,
which, in the event of disobedience would be necessary, is an Evil which the new Constitution meant to exclude as far as possible.
Id. at 134. As Rakove states, ―[Madison‘s] reservations were pragmatic. Judicial power will simply be too weak to provide a satisfactory solution to the challenges to national supremacy he still
expected the states to mount.‖ Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1525.
257 This is not to say that Madison and the other founders were unaware of the theoretical
power of courts to declare legislative acts, particularly state legislative acts, invalid as violative of
the Constitution. This is the doctrine of ―repugnancy‖ which, in a recent article, Mary Bilder has
argued was imported from English corporate law doctrines into the basis for American judicial
review. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 502
(2006). While Madison and the other founders were certainly aware of this concept as a mode of
argument, he seems to have little confidence that a judicial declaration of repugnancy or invalidity could be an effective check on legislative misconduct, even with respect to federalism concerns
where he argued, at least to the public, that the courts could adequately prevent overreaching by
state legislatures. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison).
258 See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 77–78; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962); Kramer,
We the Court, supra note 41, at 5; Rakove, Origins, supra note 29, at 1036. But see Saikrishna B.
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 894–913 (2003)
(arguing that judicial review is implicit in the constitutional text).
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there was a strong presumption against judicial invalidation of federal
legislation.259 For Madison, this was a normative as well as a pragmatic
concern. He believed the judicial branch should have no greater right to
determine the ultimate meaning of the Constitution than the other two
branches of the federal government. He made this point explicitly in his
1788 comments on Jefferson‘s ―draught‖ of a state constitution:
In the State Constitutions & indeed in the Fed‘l one also, no provision is made for the case of a disagreement in expounding them; and
as the courts are generally the last in making [their] decision, it results to them by refusing or not refusing to execute a law, to stamp it
with its final character. This makes the Judiciary Dep‘t paramount in
fact to the Legislature, which was never intended and can never be
proper.260

As Rakove points out, Madison‘s main objection to this arrangement is that it seems to give the judiciary the final say in an act‘s constitutionality as a matter of ―inadvertent final decision,‖ not on the basis of
any constitutional plan or principle.261
As a matter of normative political principle, Madison believed that
all three branches of government ―had equal authority to interpret the
fundamental law of the Constitution.‖262 Ideally, the ultimate decision
should be left to the people through some form of ―popular constitutionalism.‖263
259 Rakove, Origins, supra note 29, at 1034; see also Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra
note 12, at 798 (judicial declaration of a law‘s invalidity was ―an extraordinary and solemn political action‖ done only when there was a ―clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution‖); Treanor, supra note 243, at 458–59 (arguing that different standards of review were applied by courts
to federalism and separation of powers issues).
Describing cases in which the federal courts review the constitutionality of state legislation
as involving ―federalism‖ and those involving review of federal legislation as involving ―separation of powers‖ as Rakove frequently and Treanor sometimes does, can be somewhat misleading.
Questions involving the constitutionally valid scope of federal lawmaking authority, what we
might properly call ―federalism‖ issues can be raised in challenges to either federal or state statutes. Questions involving the federal judiciary‘s power to invalidate federal legislation, which we
might call ―separation of powers‖ issues, can only arise in review of federal legislation, but may
also involve federalism questions (as when the challenged legislative act is claimed to be within
an area of exclusive state lawmaking power). While there is some dispute in the recent historical
work as to how frequently and easily courts invalidated state statutes as unconstitutional, compare
Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 796–97 with Treanor, supra note 243, at 457–
58, there is a general consensus that successful judicial challenges to federal statutes were controversial and extremely rare. See Treanor, supra note 243, at 457–58; Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 796–97, 803–07.
260 James Madison, Observations on the “Draught of a Constitution for Virginia.‖ (Aug.
1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 294 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons
1904) [hereinafter Madison, Observations].
261 Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1530.
262 Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 796.
263 Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1529. This is a modern term for the historical
concept that authoritative determination of Constitutional meaning ultimately rests with the
people, not the Supreme Court. See generally KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 8; Kramer, We the Court, supra note 41, at 162. Madison set forth one version of ―popular constitutio-
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In writing about the role of the people in countering legislative
abuses, Madison made some distinction between laws passed by the legislature that are ―precipitate‖ or ―unjust‖ and those that are ―unconstitutional,‖ but not that much of a distinction.264 For Madison, the point is
that the legislature remains the ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality
of its own lawmaking, with the only effective check on it being the
popular electoral process itself.
With respect to the constitutionality of state laws under the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution clearly did make the Supreme Court the
ultimate arbiter of such matters,265 and Madison, in public, defended its
capacity to fulfill that role, while expressing his own doubts in private.266 We have seen, however, that Madison was normatively opposed
to any ―inadvertent‖ procedures that might give the judiciary the final
say on the constitutionality of federal legislation, believing that the
people themselves, through the electoral process, could be the only legitimate arbiters of ultimate constitutional meaning.267
Gordon Wood has argued that in order for judicial power to review
the constitutionality of federal legislation to emerge and be accepted in
the United States, there had to be changes from the time of the Foundnalism‖ in his 1788 comments to Jefferson‘s draft of a state constitution. There, Madison proposed that a ―Council of Revision‖ could act as a ―check to precipitate, to unjust, and to unconstitutional laws.‖ Madison, Observations, supra note 260, at 293–94. Legislative acts would be
communicated to the judicial and executive branches and if either objected, such objections could
only be overruled by a supermajority vote of the legislature. Id. If the objection were based on the
law‘s perceived unconstitutionality, however, even a supermajority vote would not suffice. Rather, the law would be ―suspended . . . until there shall have been a subsequent election of the
[House of Delegates]‖ and then the requisite supermajority vote by that newly elected assembly.
Id at 294. Once such approval had been achieved, however, ―it [should] not be allowed the Judges
or [the] Executive to pronounce a law thus enacted [unconstitutional] & invalid.‖ Id.; see Bednar,
supra note 246, at 227–28.
264 Id. at 293. In his comments on Jefferson‘s draft state constitution, Madison sees the role of
the council of revision for both unjust and unconstitutional laws as simply to delay enactment and
force legislative reconsideration and a supermajority vote, the sole difference being that allegedly
unconstitutional laws would be reconsidered by a newly elected legislature, id. at 293–94, after an
election in which the disputed constitutional questions would, presumably, have been a matter of
public debate. See 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 73; Sherry, supra note 36, at 1159 (discussing
comment made by Wilson at the Convention that ―laws may be unjust, may be dangerous, may be
destructive; and yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing to give
them effect.‖). Sherry argues that this notion of a ―continuum of unconstitutionality coinciding
with a continuum of injustice‖ reflects an older view of the constitution as including all fundamental law. Id. at 1159. It should also be noted that the concept of a ―continuum of unconstitutionality‖ is also very different from modern ―legal‖ notions of the Constitution.
265 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
266 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison); see also Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note
256, at 1524–28.
267 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). Contrast this with Hamilton‘s position in Federalist 78, THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), and Madison‘s willingness in permit
some interpretive work in his letter to Roane. See James Madison, Letter to Spencer Roane (June
29, 1821), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 66–67 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s
Sons 1910) [hereinafter Madison, Letter to Roane].
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ing in popular attitudes toward the Constitution itself, as well as toward
federal judges and federal legislators.268 To understand Madison‘s view
of the constitutional constraints on federal legislation at the time of the
Founding, it is necessary to revert to all these earlier positions. For
Madison in 1787 and 1788, the Constitution was not law in the ordinary
sense, but the fundamental plan for the organization of government, to
be read and interpreted with equal authority by all three branches of the
federal government, but whose final meaning could only be established
by the will of the people.269 Judges had not the power, authority, nor expertise to be its final arbiters. But the federal legislature, Madison
―hoped against hope,‖ 270 would be composed of impartial and disinterested men who would function as ―dispassionate umpires‖ in conflicts
between different interests.271 In short, while unconstitutional state laws
could and should be invalidated through normal and well-established
judicial procedures, allegedly unconstitutional actions by the federal
legislature were best corrected by the political process itself, preferably
through periodic debate and elections.272
It is against this institutional background that we must consider
Madison‘s likely understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Note first that the distinction just outlined between the procedures for
constraining unconstitutional state laws and unconstitutional federal action is reflected in the language of the Clause itself. We have seen that
for Madison, the primary purpose of the Clause was its effect on states,
to inhibit their ―trespasses‖ against each other, and to provide for their
―harmony and proper intercourse.‖273 From this perspective, the Clause
was well drafted to accomplish its purpose. It established a broad area
of federal lawmaking power, where Congress could prescribe and de268 See generally Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12. Wood argues that a radical
reconceptualization of political legitimacy took place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century. The Constitution, originally conceived as embodying fundamental principles so different
from ordinary law that its invocation by a court to nullify validly enacted legislation was ―an extraordinary, even revolutionary, expression of public authority,‖ a rare event regarded by the
founders with ―a sense of awe and wonder,‖ id. at 796, had to become ―the kind of law that an
ordinary court system could expound and construe.‖ Id. at 799. The judiciary, disparaged in the
revolutionary period as ―appendages or extensions of royal authority,‖ id. at 789-90, came to be
seen as another type of agent of the people, carrying out the people‘s will by, among other things,
keeping legislators ―within the limits assigned to their authority.‖ Id. at 794 (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)). Legislators, in turn, rather than being viewed as the
unique representatives of the people, were merely one of the people‘s agents, prone to faction and
majoritarian overreaching. They would have to come to be regarded, in short, as mere politicians.
Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 808–09; see also Rakove, Origins, supra note
29, at 1051–60 (arguing that a change in the perception of legislation led to increased acceptance
of the idea of the judiciary as a check on legislative power).
269 Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 796.
270 Id. at 792.
271 Id.
272 See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 84–85.
273 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
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scribe the rules for interstate deference, and, as federal law, those rules
would become binding on all states under the Supremacy Clause274 and
enforceable in the federal courts. With respect to the federal legislature,
however, the first sentence of the Clause imposes no express obligations
(it mandates deference only by states) and only confers power in the
second sentence, which Congress may or may not exercise.275 These different approaches to the exercise of state and federal power were epitomized by Madison‘s final amendments to the Clause, where the state‘s
obligations were expressed by the mandatory ―shall,‖ the federal government‘s by the discretionary word ―may.‖276
I argued previously that the unanimous approval of these changes
by the Committee, particularly after substantial disagreement over the
language of the second sentence, suggests that they were viewed as clarifying rather than substantive amendments.277 The discussion in this
section has indicated why that was so. Madison and many others expected that the constitution they were drafting would apply very differently to the states and to the federal legislature. For states, it would be
mandatory and the source of external constraints, giving the federal
government, in certain areas, power to invalidate state law and compel
obedience to its higher authority. For the branches of the federal government created and empowered by that constitution, however, there
were no external constraints, and that was particularly true of the federal
legislature, which had both the most direct popular support and the
broadest political power. Clearly, there was no agency of government
that could compel Congress to pass any laws its members did not want
to pass, and it was far from clear whether any such agency could prohibit Congress from acting in the few areas where the Constitution expressly forbid such action.278 Accordingly, it made sense to describe
their legislative power in terms of laws they ―may‖ choose to make.
Note that, as far as the states are concerned, there is no conflict between the first and second clauses of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
States are obligated to obey whatever deference rules federal courts derive from the first sentence of the Clause as well as any laws promulgated by Congress under the second sentence.279 Madison thereby made
use of the judiciary‘s power to enforce and perhaps strengthen existing

274
275
276
277
278
279

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
See 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 489.
See discussion supra Part II.D.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Under the constitutional plan, the obligation of state legislatures to obey deference obligations set forth both in the Constitution, as interpreted by the federal judiciary, and by the federal
legislature, is clear. A problem arises only if the Supreme Court and Congress disagree as to the
nature of that deference obligation. That is not a problem of federalism, but of separation of powers, the very problem that is the subject of this section.
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―indeterminate‖ case law under the Articles‘ clause while providing a
congressional power to alter any unfortunate decisions by an unreliable
judiciary and to increase the deference obligation over time.280 If the judiciary chose to interpret the obligations of the first sentence as a strong
rule of substantive deference, there would be less need for congressional
action. If the courts caved in to state interests, congressional power was
clearly available to correct such ―mistakes.‖
It is only the federal legislature whose powers might be viewed inconsistently under the Clause, seemingly constrained by the first sentence and unconstrained by the second. We have seen, however, that
this is an ahistorical way to look at the Clause.
We perceive the potential conflict between the first and second
sentence because we view ourselves as neutral arbiters of its meaning,
trying to understand how much power it actually gives to Congress. In
short, we put ourselves in the role of the Supreme Court, viewing the
Constitution as a species of law. Such a perspective would have been
alien to Madison, who assumed that legislative actions by Congress
were effectively unreviewable by the Supreme Court or any other agency of government.281 The broad power given under the second sentence
of the Clause would not have seemed inconsistent with the constraints
of the first from a perspective of congressional supremacy. The first
sentence defined the goal or purpose of the grant of congressional power, in much the way the copyright and patent powers were granted ―to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts,‖ or the way the
broad grant of power to prescribe the time, place, and manner of electing representatives was not inconsistent with the mandatory guarantee
of a republican form of government.282
Put another way, from Madison‘s 1787 perspective, what appears
to us to be a mandatory limitation on congressional power in the first
sentence of the clause would have appeared more like guidance or instruction to an essentially unreviewable legislative body. And, what appears to us as a grant of plenary lawmaking power in the second sentence would have appeared to Madison as simply recognition of existing
political reality. It becomes easier to understand, therefore, why the apparent conflict between the first and second sentences of the Clause

280 Madison privately expressed doubts that the judiciary would resist state interests in enforcing the Constitution. 3 Farrand, supra note 135, at 134 (Letter to Thomas Jefferson dated October
24, 1787); see also Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1523–25.
281 See discussion supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text.
282 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Crosskey argues that the draftsmanship of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is somewhat similar to the Time, Place and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4.
CROSSKEY, supra note 144, at 553 & n.†. This is significant because Crosskey also argues that
the Republican Government Clause limits the Time, Place and Manner Clause. Id. at 524. I have
argued here that the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit clause places a similar limitation on
the powers granted Congress in the second sentence of the Clause.
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would not have seemed troubling to Madison and possibly not even noticeable.
Furthermore, as we have seen, the distinction between an unwise,
improper, and unconstitutional law was not nearly as great for Madison
as it is for us now. This was in part because Americans, like English
lawyers of Madison‘s time, viewed various fundamental natural law
doctrines as constitutional constraints on legislative power.283 Probably
more significant from Madison‘s perspective, however, was that as a
practical political matter, he believed the only remedy for unconstitutional lawmaking was the same as for unwise or improper laws, a repudiation and unseating of the erring legislature through the democratic
process.284
Although Madison viewed the distinction between unconstitutional
laws and unwise ones as far less significant than we do, he nonetheless
recognized the distinction, primarily because he thought unconstitutionality provided stronger normative grounds for rejecting bad legislation,
both as an electoral issue and in the process of internal deliberation
among legislators. Accordingly, the question whether a federal law
permitting states to abrogate existing requirements of interstate deference was unconstitutional or merely unwise was a question he would
have understood, although might not have viewed as particularly important. Given the centrality of that question to contemporary legal debates
regarding the DOMA, however, it is worth examining in some detail in
the final section of this Article.
C.

The Constitution as Internal Constraint on Federal Lawmaking

Madison was famously concerned with the problem of ―faction,‖
the ―dangerous vice‖ ―under which popular governments everywhere
have perished.‖285 His hoped-for solution, or at least amelioration of the
problem, rested with his belief that a large republic, whose lawmakers
would consist of both directly and indirectly elected representatives of

283 See Sherry, supra note 36, at 1137–39; see also discussion supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. A case frequently discussed in this connection is Trevett v. Weeden, an unreported
1786 Rhode Island case striking down a Rhode Island statute that required acceptance of paper
currency as satisfaction of debts. The law was struck down, probably because it explicitly denied
defendants a right to jury trial, even though the jury trial right was not mentioned in Rhode Island‘s founding charter and Rhode Island, at the time, had no written constitution. See SNOWISS,
supra note 244, at 20–22; Sherry, supra note 36, at 1138–41.
284 See discussion supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text; see also KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 48–49.
285 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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various states, would be better able to resist the dangers of faction than
had most of the doomed republics of history.286
Madison conceived the effect of this large, representative republic
as combating faction in two quite different ways. The first was by creating a nation and a government sufficiently large and diverse that no single faction could easily come to dominate it or even control a majority
of its members, thereby making it ―less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.‖287 The natural impediments that a large republic posed to the development of factions was buttressed in the Constitution by the numerous institutional checks and balances created to further impede any
single religious persuasion, economic interest, or regional alignment
from gaining control of the government. These checks and balances
were based on a pessimistic view of human nature, which assumed that
politicians frequently acted out of narrow self-interest, or at least frequently persuaded themselves that the interests of themselves or their
group of supporters were also the best interests of the nation. Madison
hoped to cancel the deleterious effects of such self-interest by setting
various modes of self-interested conduct in opposition to each other.
But there was another side to Madison‘s plan to combat faction,
one based on a more optimistic view of human nature. Madison believed that elected representatives could act out of more than just selfinterested or partisan motives. They could be ―representatives whose
enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local
prejudices and schemes of injustice,‖288 who would be ―proper guardians of the public weal,‖ and whose decisions ―will be more consonant
to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves.‖ The
Constitution provided institutional means to promote this defense to faction as well: the indirect election of representatives through ―the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice
will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.‖289
These two different means of combating the problem of faction
were not at all inconsistent, but rather reflect a subtle and sophisticated
understanding of psychology and political theory on the part of Madison. Recognizing that politicians can, at various times and under various
circumstances, act out of narrow self-interest or unselfish concern for
the public good, Madison sought to create a system which he hoped

286
287
288
289

RAKOVE, MADISON, supra note 17, at 49–57; Strahan, supra note 18, 75–84.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
Id.
Id.
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would reduce incentives for the former and multiply instances of the latter.290
In considering the extent to which Madison expected the Constitution to restrain and direct the actions of the legislature, we should consider its effects on the legislators he hoped for, those of ―enlightened
views and virtuous sentiments,‖ not the factional rabble rousers he
feared. One of the most important values Madison hoped for in a legislator was impartiality. As Gordon Wood explains, ―[Madison] hoped
against hope that the new, elevated federal government might assume a
judicial-like character and become a disinterested and dispassionate
umpire in disputes between different interests within the individual
states.‖291
That Madison sought ―judicial-like‖ virtues in his ideal legislators
is not surprising given that he viewed the art of governing itself as a
large, complex, and never-ending adjudication of the aggregate claims
of innumerable groups and interests within the polity. While we can
find this point made in Madison‘s private writings,292 he makes it most
clearly and powerfully in Federalist No. 10:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt
his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are
unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are
many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial
determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons,
but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are
the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the
causes which they determine?293

Such impartial, judicious, and public-minded legislators would
nonetheless be, and feel themselves to be, bound by the Constitution. In
the first place, the people themselves ratified the Constitution, in their
various state conventions, and we have seen that for Madison, the
people themselves were the ultimate source of constitutional authority.
Legislators who adhered to the constitutional plan were following the
will of the people, but in a manner that was ―more consonant to the public good‖ than that of politicians who appealed to the baser instincts of
the public. Madison expected Congress to stay within the powers
granted by the Constitution to the federal government, which, he noted,
290 Robertson, supra note 24, at 200–01 (―Madison in effect proposed to reconstitute the national government so that the national policy-makers‘ ambitions would be driven by a material
concern for national advantage.‖); Strahan, supra note 18, at 63.
291 Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 792 (quoting Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
292 See Madison, Letter to Washington, supra note 26, at 346; Wood, Judicial Review Revisited, supra note 12, at 809.
293 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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were ―few and defined,‖ yet he also argued that in any contest for the
people‘s loyalty, it was the states who were far more likely to encroach
on federal prerogatives than the opposite. Popular preference for the
federal government could only be won by ―manifest and proofs of a better administration‖ and such superior administration was possible, Madison asserted, ―only within a certain sphere.‖294
Able and conscientious legislators, therefore, would seek to stay
within their designated constitutional role even without any external
constraint. They would do so because (1) it was their democratic duty,
as representatives of the people, to carry out the people‘s will as expressed in the Constitution; (2) as prudential legislators, they would
recognize that the national government can only effectively administer
within a limited sphere; and (3) the Constitution would itself ―acquire
by degrees the character of fundamental maxims of free Government.‖295
With respect to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Madison consistently described the grant of federal power there as an obvious instance
where federal lawmaking would be superior to that of the states. This
was because the states had already proven themselves inadequate to the
task by ―trespassing‖ on each other‘s rights and because the national interest was so clearly in favor of promotion of interstate harmony by requiring state deference to other state‘s laws and judicial proceedings, in
a neutral and disinterested manner. Madison‘s few public statements
concerning the constitutional grant of such power to Congress shows
that he viewed Congress‘s superior ability to act in this area to be obvious and indisputable.296 Note, however, that Madison‘s presumption
of the superiority of federal lawmaking in this area is premised on his
assumption that such lawmaking will be directed toward a particular
294
295

THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 269, 273 (Gaillard Hunt ed., G.P. Putnam‘s Sons 1904). Madison made this point as
one of the primary arguments in favor of a bill of rights. Madison seriously waffled on the question whether a bill of rights would be necessary or beneficial. He opposed it in the Federalist as
unneeded. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison); see
also LABUNSKI, supra note 31, at 62. But Madison later changed his mind for what appear to be
primarily prudential political reasons. See id. at 62–63, 159.
In the above letter, however, Madison tells Jefferson, he ―has always been in favor of a bill
of rights‖ as something that ―might be of use‖ but had not ―viewed it in an important light.‖ Madison, Letter to Jefferson, supra note 119, at 271. Although Madison expressed doubts, based on
historical experience, that a bill of rights could protect effectively against ―overbearing majorities‖ or, on occasion, by ―a succession of artful and ambitious rulers.‖ Id. at 273. Nonetheless,
many of Madison‘s arguments both for and against the bill of rights assume that the Constitutional constraints it contains will be followed most of the time by conscientious lawmakers. That is
why he is so concerned that prohibitions on federal lawmaking not be enumerated in such a way
as to give the federal government either too much power or too little.
296 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); 3 Elliot, supra note 196, at 584–85 (―Statement
during Debates on Virginia‘s Ratification of the Constitution‖).
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and obviously beneficial purpose: promotion of interstate harmony and
economic stability through deference by states to each other‘s laws and
judicial proceedings.
We have seen that Madison preferred Morris‘s vague yet potentially expandable version of the first sentence of the Clause to Randolph‘s
clearer, more detailed, but static rule that included substantive deference, because Madison ―wished the Legislature might be authorized to
provide for the execution of Judgments in other States, under such regulations as might be expedient‖ and believed this was ―justified by the
nature of the Union.‖297 The call that any subsequent exercise of legislative power be ―authorized‖ by the Constitution again demonstrates
Madison‘s assumption that the Congress, even if not subject to judicial
review, would operate under constitutional constraints.
What were those constitutional constraints that limited Congressional power to make laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause? The
first, and perhaps most interesting, is the one Madison expressly appealed to at the Convention, the ―nature of the [federal] union.‖298 It was
on this ground that Madison believed a law providing for interstate execution of judgments was ―justified.‖299 For Madison, then, the nature
of the Union itself provided some constraint on the kind of actions Congress could legitimately take. Increased obligations of interstate deference were consistent with the new ―more perfect‖ union300 that the
framers were creating. If the nature of the federal union could provide
justification for legislative actions that created stronger interstate deference obligations, the nature of the union could also provide a powerful
argument against any legislative actions that would weaken existing interstate deference obligations. In this way the full faith and credit obligation was tied, for Madison, to a fundamental constitutional principle—that the Constitution had created an indissoluble federal union
297
298
299
300

2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 448.
Id.
Id.
Madison‘s argument here clearly invokes reference to the Preamble to the Constitution
(drafted by the Committee on Style of which Madison was a member). The qualitatively ―more
perfect‖ union referred to there is universally (or at least judicially) assumed to draw comparison
with the less perfect union that had previously existed under the Articles of Confederation. See
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) (―[W]hen these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained to form a more perfect
Union‖) (internal quotation marks removed), overruled on other grounds by Morgan v. United
States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885); see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549–50 (1876).
In this sense, the two unions are directly analogous to the two full faith and credit clauses of the
Articles and Constitution respectively, with that latter being an ―evident and valuable improvement‖ on the former, because it authorizes Congress to make laws clarifying and strengthening
the deference obligations set forth in the clause. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison). Laws
that weakened or abrogated existing deference obligations would obviously not constitute such
improvements and would not be consistent with the ―more perfect union‖ the framers were seeking to create.
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that could not be weakened or eroded by the actions of individual
states.301
We have seen that Madison always viewed the Full Faith and Credit Clause as an obvious and unproblematic case for the exercise of federal power.302 Randolph and other Virginians thought giving the federal
government power to determine the effects of one state‘s law in another
was a vast and unjustified expansion of federal power. Why did Madison not view it the same way? Unlike Hamilton, he was no ardent advocate of federal power who wished to see the states wither away. He was
a disciple of Jefferson, an advocate of a strong but limited federal government, which he felt should take on only those ―limited powers‖ that
could be well administered by the federal government. Promotion of interstate deference was clearly such a power for Madison because (1) it
had already been set forth as a national concern in the Articles of Confederation and (2) the federal government could function effectively as a
dispassionate promoter of interstate harmony in a way the states could
not. Madison viewed the grant of federal legislative power in the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as a limited and uncontroversial power needed
to promote interstate deference and harmony and thereby strengthen the
Union. Use of that power to abrogate existing interstate deference obligations would not only be unwise and shortsighted but inconsistent with
the constitutional justifications for granting such power.
The constitutional obligation of interstate deference came from two
main and somewhat overlapping sources: the clause in the Articles of
Confederation and the law of nations. There is no indication in any document of the time that the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause was intended to empower Congress to displace or abrogate the
interstate deference obligations that existed under the Articles‘ clause
and continued under the first sentence of the Constitution‘s clause.303
301 See Madison, Letter to Roane, supra note 267, at 65. Madison‘s correspondence with
Spencer Roane (Patrick Henry‘s son-in-law and a strong states rights proponent, see Rakove,
Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1533) are the clearest statements we have of Madison‘s continued commitment to Federalist principles in the face of a rising tide of concern in southern
states over perceived federal incursions on state sovereignty. In that letter, Madison, while sympathetic to many of Roane‘s critiques of particular Supreme Court actions, strongly defends the
federal (as opposed to the state) judiciary‘s role as ultimate arbiters of the boundaries of federal
power. Madison, Letter to Roane, supra note 267, at 66–67. Madison argued that if individual
states were allowed to decide such constitutional questions for themselves the degree of sovereignty retained ―might become different in every state‖ and that this would destroy ―the vital
principle of equality, which cements their Union.‖ Id. at 66. It is easy to imagine Madison making
a similar argument if presented with a proposal to allow each state to decide how much deference
to give to other states‘ judgments. For a detailed discussion of the Roane correspondence, see
Rakove, Judicial Power, supra note 256, at 1534–42.
302 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison); 3 Elliot, supra note 196, at 584–85
(―Statement during Debates on Virginia‘s Ratification of the Constitution‖).
303 The only support for such a view derives from a strained ahistorical reading of the second
sentence of the Clause which not only puts it in conflict with the first sentence, but which I have
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While those obligations were admittedly somewhat vague, they included at least, most scholars agree, a prima facie rule of validity regarding most out-of-state judgments, and very likely a rule of substantive deference regarding admiralty judgments, and perhaps other out-ofstate judgments as well.304 The ongoing disputes regarding the Articles‘
clause, as the more legally sophisticated of the Framers well understood, was whether the Articles‘ clause embodied only the same deference obligations that existed among independent states under the law
of nations, or whether it strengthened and increased those obligations.
We have seen that Madison had good reasons for wanting to give Congress the power to eliminate this uncertainty by legislating stronger deference obligations, but there is no indication that either Madison or his
opponents believed they were thereby also giving Congress a right to
abrogate the deference obligations that then existed among the states.305
This conclusion becomes even stronger if we accept the arguments
of Crosskey, Sherry, and others that the constitutional constraints on
federal lawmaking envisioned by the Framers also included the fundamental principles of the law of nations. Such arguments are consistent
with the concern for vested rights that pervades much of Madison‘s
thinking and writing during this period, not only with respect to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, but also regarding paper currency, enforcement
of contracts, and a whole panoply of constitutional limitations and restrictions on debt obligations. It is hard to imagine that the man who advocated so strongly for all of those restrictions would have also advocated a Clause that he believed gave the federal legislature the right to
relieve states of their obligations to enforce the debts or other vested
rights incurred or declared in sister states.306 Accordingly, it appears
shown to be the product of a mistakenly ―legalistic‖ approach to constitutional interpretation
which was not part of Madison‘s original intent. We have seen that in a period without substantial
judicial review of congressional lawmaking, the second sentence looks less like a ―legal‖ grant of
absolute discretionary power (and therefore insulated from judicial review) and more like a simple allocation of power to Congress rather than the states to carry out the purposes set forth generally in the first sentence of the Clause.
304 See Engdahl, supra note 1, at 1584; Sachs, supra note 1, at 1224–26; Whitten, FF&C and
DOMA, supra note 3, at 282. Whitten states that substantive deference was also applied to defensive uses of foreign judgments under English law and there was at least a serious argument that
the Articles‘ clause and the first sentence of the constitutional clause embodied a rule of substantive deference for all sister state judgments. Whitten, State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at
534.
305 Randolph‘s objection to the effects clause was not that it gave Congress new or unprecedented powers, but that it ―usurp[ed]‖ existing state powers. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 488–89. It
is unlikely that Randolph thought that state legislatures had the power to abrogate the deference
obligations that existed under the Articles‘ clause or the law of nations. Accordingly, neither
would the federal legislature.
306 The hardest question that can be raised with respect to this line of argument is whether
there were some questions that were so potentially divisive among the states that Madison would
have recognized a power to abrogate the full faith and credit obligation with respect to such issues. It is worth noting that the one issue that might have caused such division, slavery, was ac-
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quite likely that to Madison, any law enacted by Congress that diminished rather than strengthened the existing interstate full faith and credit obligation would have been a violation of the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
This Article is intended as a work of history, an inquiry into the
way Madison‘s arguments and writing in connection with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause fit into his broader views regarding fundamental constitutional questions. It has shown that the debate about the Full Faith
and Credit Clause at the Constitutional Convention was not primarily
about evidentiary versus substantive rules, but between advocates of a
substantive but static and limited rule of deference clearly set out in the
constitutional text, and those, like Madison, who favored a more vague
but more dynamic rule of substantive deference that could be enforced
and strengthened by congressional enactment. It has also shown that the
Clause was part of a broader plan by Madison and others to curb the
ability of states to take actions that were harmful to one another and to
the nation as a whole. Madison was particularly concerned with state
actions that he felt interfered with vested contractual rights created or
enforced in other states, thereby jeopardizing the country‘s economic
well being. In this way, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was closely
tied to other provisions seeking to prevent states from infringing vested
rights, like the contract and bankruptcy clauses.
Most centrally, however, this piece has been concerned with how
Madison would have viewed the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
apparent conflict between the first and second sentences that looms so
large in contemporary debates about the meaning of the Clause. We
have seen that for Madison, viewing the issue not from the perspective
of a court engaged in judicial review, but as a legislator, seeking to act
within constitutional limits, the conflict largely disappears. The power
granted to Congress in the second sentence is discretionary to reflect the
fact that Congress, as the supreme lawmaking power of the nation, not
only cannot be forced to take action, but would also be, Madison expected, the final arbiter of its own obligations under the Constitution.
tually removed from the full faith and credit obligation and made the subject of a constitutional
rule of substantive deference beyond the power of Congress to alter. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2,
cl. 3 (Fugitive Slave Clause). Even this disgraceful part of constitutional history, however, reflects the Founders‘ belief that it was deference to each other‘s laws that would bind the states
together. Surely Madison would have been highly skeptical of any claim that it was necessary for
a harmonious union that one state abrogate rights created under the laws of a sister state. In light
of recent events like the federal government‘s suspension of ―Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell‖ and refusal
to enforce Section 3 of DOMA, it is certainly hard to imagine an argument that Section 2 of
DOMA is necessary to preserve the Union.
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Those obligations, however, would still include promotion of interstate
harmony and the deference to each other‘s laws and judicial proceedings set forth in the first sentence of the clause. Laws that violated such
obligations might not be unenforceable in Madison‘s political model,
but they would be unconstitutional.
The interest in these issues, of course, is strongly influenced by
current debates regarding the DOMA and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. The historical arguments made in this Article might be used to
justify any of three rather different positions in that debate. First, one
might argue that the Madisonian conception of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause differs so dramatically from our own—colored as it is by 200
years of Supreme Court interpretive glosses that Madison might well
have viewed with suspicion but that have now hardened into authoritative ―law‖—that analysis of Madison‘s thought, as well as other attempts to ascertain the original intent of the Framers, can provide little
useful guidance on the contemporary legal issue of the constitutionality
of DOMA. This is a respectable position, and one that implicates a large
and ever-growing literature on the role of original intent in contemporary Constitutional interpretation.307 I do not intend to add to it here.
A second position would be to emphasize Madison‘s 1787 belief in
legislative supremacy and argue that as a practical, if not a normative
matter, Madison believed that Congress under the new Full Faith and
Credit Clause would be free to pass any law it liked regarding the effects of out-of-state judgments without fear of any institutional interference from the other branches of government, and that this justifies a
reading of the second sentence of the Clause as a grant of ―plenary‖
power. This strikes me as a disingenuous reading of Madison‘s thought,
focusing only on practical political concerns and not on his broader
normative vision. Moreover, it is inaccurate even as a statement of Madison‘s political theory, because while Madison recognized that Congress
might have the power to act without effective constraint, he did not
hope or believe that they would do so.
Finally, the third, and I think strongest, argument is that the core
Madisonian conception of the Full Faith and Credit Clause required that
states recognize and give substantial deference to the judgments and
other official acts of sister states, particularly when they involved vested
contract and property rights, including the contractual and property
rights created by marriage. For Madison this obligation of sister-state
deference was an obvious and necessary corollary to the creation of a
federal union. While Madison acknowledged that the precise form and
degree of that deference was somewhat uncertain, and he specifically
sought to give the federal legislature power to define and strengthen that
307 See generally ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed.,
2007).
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deference obligation over time, he hoped and believed that the legislators were constrained by fundamental constitutional norms from abrogating existing sister-state deference obligations. Accordingly, any law,
like DOMA, which purports to leave states free to ignore important marital and other contractual rights granted pursuant to the laws and legal
proceedings of sister states is a violation of that original Madisonian intent.

